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Abbreviations and their explanations
Abbreviation Complete name Explanation
AiF Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller For-
schungsvereinigungen
Working Group of Industrial Research Organizations
DFG Deutsche Forschungs-Gemeinschaft Federal research council
DtA Deutsche Ausgleichsbank Government-owned development bank
EFRE Europäischer Fond für regionale
Entwicklung
European regional development fund
ERP European Recovery Program Revolving fund for government-targeted investments,
administrated by KfW and DtA
ESF Europäischer Sozialfonds European fund for social development
FhG Fraunhofer Gesellschaft Applied research organization
FHS Fachhochschule University of applied science, normally without
courses at postgraduate level
GA Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Förderung
der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur
Federal regulatory framework for regional policy
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung Limited liability company
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Government-owned development bank
MPG Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Basic research organization
NRW North Rhine-Westphalia largest Land
REFA Verband für Arbeitsgestaltung, Be-
triebsorganisation und Unternehmen-
sentwicklung (founded as “Reichs-
ausschuß für Arbeitszeitermittlung”)
Non-governmental support organization, specialized on
basic and ongoing training in industrial engineering
RKW Rationalisierungs- und Innovations-
zentrum der Deutschen Wirtschaft
(before: Rationalisierungskuratorium
der Deutschen Wirtschaft)
Non-governmental support organization, specialized on
ongoing training in industrial engineering
TGZ Technologie- und Gründerzentrum Technology incubator
ZEW Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschafts-
forschung
Economic think-tank
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1 Introduction1
The existence of highly dynamic and suc-
cessful small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SME) is one of the characteristic
features of the German economy. They
have been, and continue to be, a growth
and a job machine. Their strong perform-
ance has raised interest in other countries,
with less dynamic SME, which are keen to
strengthen their SME sector. Learning
from the German experience appears as a
promising exercise.
What is essential here is to take a suffi-
ciently wide perspective since it would be
inadequate to look at the German SME
support policies only. There is a causal
link between SME support and the per-
formance of German SME, but there are
more such links. Ignoring them would
give an inadequate picture of the determi-
nants of SME development in Germany.
In order to understand the performance of
German SME, it is useful to refer to the
concept of systemic competitiveness (Es-
ser et al. 1995).
At the meta-level, there are several ele-
ments which create a favorable framework
for SME. Probably most importantly, the
social status of entrepreneurs is high, and
entrepreneurial success is an important
means of ascendance to higher social
strata. This is embedded in a politico-
economic context which is development-
oriented, with a strong commitment to
                                                  
1 This paper has been prepared in the context
of the joint CEPAL / GTZ Project "Institu-
tional Requirements for Market-Led Struc-
tures in Latin America and the Caribbean".
For comments on an earlier version we are
indebted to Dietrich von Graevenitz, Gün-
ther Held, and Jorge Katz. We are also grate-
ful for the permission to publish the English
version of this paper as an INEF Report. A
Spanish version is going to be published by
CEPAL.
creating a very stable macro-economic
framework and a business-friendly environ-
ment while at the same time alleviating the
negative social impact of industrialization, i.e.
a social market economy as opposed to a free
market economy. It is a widely shared view
that the basic organization of the German
economy in this respect differs from the An-
glo-Saxon variety of contemporary capitalism.
Moreover, there are numerous institutions that
stabilize macro-economic conditions, such as
restrictive rules for prudential banking, which
have shielded the German economy from
speculative bubbles. There are also institu-
tions which keep transaction costs low, such
as a well-developed (and actually SME-
friendly) contract law2 and a well-established
system of collective bargaining. In fact, many
of the institutions which shape the German
economy have been crafted deliberately after
World War II to avoid repeating the economic
disasters of the 1920s and the early post-war
years (hyperinflations in 1922/23 and prior to
the monetary reform of 1948, depression after
1929). Others reflect more positive experi-
ence, such as the preference given to the so-
cial market economy and social security sys-
tems which go back to the last quarter of the
19th century.
At the macro-level, conditions for SME are
moderately favorable. The macro-economic
conditions are generally business-friendly, yet
there are some aspects which discriminate
against SME. This applies specifically to the
tax system. Marginal tax rates on profits are
comparatively high (up to 53 %). The effec-
tive tax burden can be much lower, as there
are all sorts of loopholes, like various means
which allow firms to stash away a substantial
part of their surplus as a reserve rather than
declare it as a profit. However, large firms
                                                  
2 For an in-depth discussion of this aspect, which
we will not pursue further, see Casper (1998).
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have much more latitude to use such loop-
holes than SME.
Another important macro-economic factor
is European integration. While there is a
certain element of protectionism against
non-EU-imports, competition between the
European states is fierce, being based on
high-quality products, technologically ad-
vanced production processes, high quality
standards and high qualification of the en-
trepreneurs and workers. German SME are
directing three fourths of their exports to
other EU countries. The introduction of
the common currency and the integration
of East European states into this market
will both increase competition and struc-
tural change in Germany and create new
opportunities for companies.
At the meso-level, it is important to note
that there is no specialized SME support
institution in Germany. Instead, there is a
highly differentiated system of organiza-
tions and policies which creates favorable
conditions for private business in general
and SME in particular. The subsequent
sections of this paper will investigate this
in detail.
At the micro-level, markets are mostly
highly competitive, and the degree of spe-
cialization, vertical disintegration and dif-
ferentiation is high, thus lowering barriers
to entry and favoring nimble and flexible
SME. There is ample latitude for inter-
firm cooperation so that SME can over-
come disadvantages which are due to a
lack of economies of scale. The labor
market provides SME with skilled work-
ers, yet their layoff in phases of economic
downturn poses major problems. The fi-
nancial system is offering credit to all
types of firms. Access to technology ap-
pears not to be a problem, either. Regard-
ing competition, the situation is somewhat
different in the craft sector, where barriers
to entry which are based on the formal quali-
fication of potential entrepreneurs reduce
competitive pressure. At the same time, a high
level of skills creates the conditions for con-
stant technical upgrading.
Developing countries and countries in transi-
tion generally display grave shortcomings at
all these four levels. To understand the com-
petitiveness of SME in Germany, it is not suf-
ficient to focus only at the parameters relevant
to competition at all the levels. It is the aim of
this paper to demonstrate especially the inter-
relations and interdependencies between
them, which sustain the efforts to build com-
petitive advantages within SME.
It is neither the ‘Developmental State’ nor the
market alone that is able to create favorable
conditions at all levels, and a dynamic inter-
play between them. A lot of Latin American
countries made this experience in the crises of
the import-substitution phase in the 60s and
70s and after the liberalization process, espe-
cially in the 80s and 90s. Germany has a range
of government support policies at the Euro-
pean, national, regional, and local levels.
Manifold public and private institutions are
responsible for the implementation of sup-
porting instruments. Chapter 2 will discuss
definitions and give an overview of the quan-
titative importance of SME. Chapter 3 will
paint a picture of the employment, qualifica-
tion, innovation and competition performance
of SME in Germany with an added focus on
the situation in the new Länder (federal states)
in the East of the country. Chapter 4 will con-
centrate on some of the most important inter-
mediary institutions and their organizational
forms. Chapter 5 portrays SME support poli-
cies at the European, national and regional
levels. The last three chapters of this paper
will discuss justification and evaluation of
SME support, the future of SME development
and support policies in Germany, and some
conclusions for policy makers in Latin Amer-
ica.
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2 The importance of SME in
the German economy
Development of German SME received
rising attention in the last thirty years.
Within the country they were increasingly
expected to substitute for job losses in old
firms and industries. They are supposed to
play a dynamic role in several respects:
• in occupation to substitute for jobs
lost due to downsizing of large en-
terprises;
• in innovation due to their potential
of specialization;
• in structural change and the process
of globalization because of their
flexibility;
• in economic growth due to their ex-
port and expansion potential.
Outside the country small and medium
enterprises are treated as an equivalent to
the label "Made in Germany", which has
come to stand for first-class technology,
high-quality craftsmanship and export
success. In this sense, German SME have
the image of being very innovative, disci-
plined and creative. But this image was the
object of controversial discussion in the
last years, mainly as a result of compara-
tive studies of German, North American
and Japanese SME. In such a perspective,
German entrepreneurs were depicted as
traditional, paternalistic, technology- but
not market- and demand-oriented, and less
innovation-oriented than expected. Terms
referring to SME as "hidden champions"
(Simon 1996) or "problem child" (Heise et
al. 1999), and headlines like "Can Ger-
many still innovate?" are reflecting these
divergent views. In any case, a heroic
view of German SME, taking them as the
crucial element of Germany’s economic
dynamism, is at best only part of a reality
which in fact is complex and contradic-
tory.
Contrary to a widespread opinion, the German
economy is dominated by large enterprises,
although SME have a great share in the num-
ber of companies, occupation, and apprentice-
ship posts. To understand the large-enterprise
dominated structure in Germany, which con-
flicts with the country’s reputation in the
world, one has to know that a lot of enter-
prises are large, measured by their turnover
and number of employees, even though they
share many qualitative features with SME.
This is linked with the self-definition of the
owners of these firms, but also with the his-
torical and cultural significance of the term
Mittelstand and its consequences for the clas-
sification scheme for SME in Germany.
2.1 The definition of the German term
Mittelstand: Its qualitative and
quantitative aspects
The analysis of SME in Germany requires to
understand the meaning of the term Mittel-
stand, since the latter is much more widely
used in the country. Its modern definition
comprises a number of dimensions and must
be distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon ex-
pression "small and medium-sized enter-
prises" (SME). Whereas the term SME mainly
focuses on economic units, the expression
Mittelstand indicates not only a certain group
of entrepreneurs but also sociological, historic
and psychological aspects.
The Mittelstand has its historical roots in the
social order of the middle age, where the es-
tates ("Stände", i.e. groups of citizens ac-
cording to socio-economic status, for example
nobility, craftsmen, traders, farmers, etc.)
were assigned to special responsibilities This
term still points out the position of these en-
trepreneurs in today’s social system of Ger-
man society. It describes a certain stratum of
society, somewhat similar to the meaning of
the English term "middle class", but with pre-
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industrial connotations. In this sense a
definition of a Mittelstand company can-
not be restricted to the value of its assets,
the amount of its turnover or the number
of its employees. Just looking at numbers
leads into a wrong direction, because it
neglects that the Mittelstand is character-
ized by certain convictions and attitudes in
the context of socio-economic and politi-
cal processes. The international economic
press and literature increasingly puts at-
tention to these specific characteristics and
avoids translating the term Mittelstand al-
together (Hauser 1998: 1).
As if this were not complicated enough, a
further special feature in the German
economy has to be mentioned in this con-
text, namely the persistence of a craft
sector ("Handwerk"). In pre-industrial
times, this sector was highly organized
and restrictively governed; in medieval
cities, entry into the guilds of the craft
sector was tightly controlled, supply was
thus limited, and vocational training was
regulated. This system came under intense
pressure during the 19th century, as it cre-
ated severe obstacles to the industrializa-
tion process. In most parts of Prussia,
freedom of economic activity became an
established legal right in 1811, but it was
restricted again after the revolution of
1848. It was only with the creation of the
German Reich in 1871 that the Prussian
laws were extended to the whole territory
(Kiesewetter 1989). Around 1900, due to
the precarious economic situation of and
political pressure from small businesses,
that freedom was restricted again, and the
establishment of chambers of crafts cre-
ated a dual structure of crafts on the one
hand and industries and services on the
other. What makes a craft business is de-
fined by law, and even though there is
some common understanding, the bounda-
ries are fuzzy, and they are changing over
time. Crafts cover both small-scale industry,
such as manufacturing of bread or preparation
of meat and sausages and many segments of
the construction industry (plumbing, electrical
installation, installation of heating systems,
tiling, etc.), and the service sector, such as car
repair, cycle repair, opticians, hairdressers,
etc., which means that a substantial part of the
retail trade is also part of the craft sector. The
sector has specific barriers to entry, since only
a Meister (i.e. a person who has gone through
extensive, multi-year vocational training), or a
person who succeeds in hiring a Meister, is
entitled to run a Handwerk firm.
Looking back at history, it is also important to
note that industrialization in Germany started
spontaneously, influenced by the British expe-
rience, but was located initially mostly in
those places where water power was avail-
able; it was only at a late stage of industriali-
zation in Germany that the steam engine
started to play a prominent role (Radkau
1989). It also was only after a protracted pe-
riod of autonomous evolution of private busi-
ness that government industrial policy, to
some extent pushed by economists such as
Friedrich List, became prominent. Accord-
ingly, SME were the seedbed of industrial de-
velopment in Germany; even the Siemens
brothers, Friedrich Krupp and Carl Benz
started their businesses this way. This is quite
distinct from the situation in developing
countries, especially in those countries where
economic growth was for a long time based
on the extraction of natural resources. In those
countries, the insight that even an extended
evolution and accumulation in small metal-
working companies will not lead to the emer-
gence of a steel industry was one of the mo-
tives which led to government industrial poli-
cies.
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Qualitative aspects
The strong link between enterprise and
owner has consistently been emphasized
as the most important qualitative aspect of
the Mittelstand. This relationship finds its
expression in
• the identity of ownership and legal
responsibility for the enterprise’s
activities,
• the identity of ownership and liabil-
ity between the entrepreneur and the
enterprise,
• the personal responsibility taken by
the entrepreneur himself regarding
decision-making.
This strong link between enterprise and
entrepreneur is decisive for the enter-
prise’s success or failure. Three quarters
of Mittelstand companies are family-
owned, and a substantial percentage is
manufacturing-based. Many of the me-
dium-sized enterprises were founded
around the turn of the last century or after
the World War II. Their reputation is that
• the founders of these companies
were talented innovators, constantly
searching for ways to improve their
products and to create new ones;
• these enterprises boast a leadership
style marked by high social respon-
sibility, strong and personal guid-
ance as well as a close and pater-
nalist relationship with the staff,
• the management style emphasizes
long-term results, long-term rela-
tionships, highly qualified workers
and an ingredient of simplicity,
which in a positive view gives the
chance of focusing on the essentials
of a situation, seeing the forest for
the trees. In a negative sense this
management style can also lead to
the opposite, seeing the trees and not
the forest. A lot of Mittelstand enter-
prises entered into crises since they
were not able to modernize their hierar-
chical organizational structure and
technology-based products and lacked a
clear customer-focus, thus neglecting
the demands in their market.
Until now these operational structures have
been typical of the Mittelstand. There are, of
course, differences between sectors and firms.
But there are still numerous cases where the
qualitative criteria adequately describe the
overall enterprise (Muzyka et al. 1997: 148).
In this respect, even manufacturing enterprises
with more than 500 employees are defined as
Mittelstand (Hauser 1998: 2).
Although this qualitative definition of the
Mittelstand has its advantages, especially with
respect to the attempt to focalize on the cul-
tural roots and self-definition, it has its limits.
As in every other country the SME segment in
Germany is very heterogeneous. Today, the
identity of ownership and legal responsibility
for the entrepreneurs and the enterprises’ fi-
nancial situation is becoming less ubiquitous.
The GmbH (limited liability company) is be-
coming a typical legal form, especially in me-
dium-sized and large enterprises. In future the
more successful companies will increasingly
organize as joint stock companies. It must be
assumed that the legal form of GmbH is pri-
marily chosen in order to restrict the financial
risk of the entrepreneur, i.e. in a qualitative
perspective they remain, in most cases, classic
Mittelstand companies despite the legal form.3
                                                  
3 Lageman et al. (1999: 82) observe that the num-
ber of GmbHs rose from 122,000 to 513,000
between 1974 and 1998. This applied especially
to medium-sized and large enterprises.
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Quantitative aspects
Because of the difficulties of qualitative
definition, both researchers and German
economic policy-makers use a more
pragmatic, quantitative classification for
SME. But regardless of the indicators cho-
sen, the quantitative analysis will always
be a purpose-oriented approximation
which clarifies the examination. In the
following sections the definition of Mittel-
stand will be used as a synonym for SME
in Germany, bearing in mind the qualita-
tive aspects of the term as well as its het-
erogeneity and limits.
The usual quantitative classification in
Germany applies the criteria "number of
employees" and "turnover" to distinguish
between small, medium-sized and large
enterprises:
This is the common classification within
Germany, although sometimes small en-
terprises are classified as having less than
50 employees. The German government
refuses an official classification, pointing
at the heterogeneity of SME, the mixture
of qualitative and quantitative aspects of
the Mittelstand, the different criteria in the
support programs and at the different clas-
sifications of neighboring countries and
the EU Commission (Deutscher Bundestag
1970: 2).
The different classifications in the neighbor-
ing countries illustrate the variety of defini-
tions in Europe. Whereas in Ireland the upper
limit for SME is 50 employees, it is 100 in the
Netherlands. In France even enterprises with
1,000 employees are seen as medium-sized
ones (De 1996: 12).
Despite all the differences, in 1996 the Euro-
pean Commission defined a minimum con-
sensus for a unified classification in the EU.
This classification does not take into account
the different enterprise structures of the Euro-
pean states, especially when comparing the
smaller and larger as well as the Northern and
Southern countries.4 While the definition con-
siders more fairly the enterprise structure of
the smaller South European member states, it
is not adequate for the larger Central and
North European countries (Lageman et al.
1999: 40).
To sum up, a uniform and strictly scientific
definition for SME in the EU and Germany
does not really exist. The quantitative frame-
                                                  
4 The EU classification is nearer the classification
of many Latin American countries, despite ex-
isting differences.
Table 1: Classification scheme for small and medium sized enterprises in Germany
Size of enterprise Number of Employees Turnover DM/Year
Small Up to 9 Up to 1 million
Medium-sized 10 to 499 1 to 100 million
Large 500 and more 100 million and more
(Source: De 1996: 14)
Table 2: Classification scheme for SME in the European Union
Size of Enter-
prise
Number of Em-
ployees
Turnover (ECU) Annual balance sheet
(ECU)
Share of large firms /
holding in equity, %
Small Up to 50 Up to 7 million Up to 5 million Less than 33
Middle Up 250 Up to 40 million Up to 27 million Less than 33
(Source: Geilen & Vielhaber 1999: 7)
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work can be useful if the boundaries of the
classifications are not taken too strictly.
Especially the attempt of a unified quanti-
tative definition within the EU is worth
mentioning. With the internationalization
of the economy, a definition within the
national context becomes obsolete any-
way. Some of Germany’s export-oriented
medium-sized enterprises have become
multinationals in the last twenty years.
This includes most of the enterprises which
have been labeled hidden champions, i.e. lit-
tle-known firms which are highly successful
niche players in global markets. To find a
more reliable and unified definition for SME
in Europe and Germany, it will be inevitable
to consider the processes of enterprise expan-
sion (especially within the medium-sized
companies) at the global level. This can fa-
cilitate the elaboration of more differentiated
structural and economic classifications within
Germany and the EU. In the following sec-
tions this paper will use the German classifi-
cations mentioned above.
2.2 The overall economic relevance of
the Mittelstand
Most of the large OECD economies are domi-
nated by large enterprises, Italy being a nota-
ble exception. Figure 1 shows that the share of
large firms in manufacturing employment is
substantially higher in Germany than in other
OECD countries. Looking at the whole of the
private sector, the German profile is not much
different from that of Canada, the U.K and
France (Figure 2). In other words, data do not
sustain the view that Germany is a SME
economy; if there is a SME economy in
Europe, then it is Italy.
Figure 3 indicates the share of SME with re-
spect to different indicators; data on number
of enterprises and turnover are based on VAT
statistics. A comparison of the VAT statistics
from 1970 to 1996 shows a strong increase of
the share of large enterprises in turnover.
Whereas in 1996 more than 50 % of turnovers
were obtained by only 6,277 large enterprises
(over DM 100 million turnover), in 1970 it
was only 37 %. On the other hand, more than
80 % of the enterprises subject to VAT are
small enterprises (up to 1 million turnover),
but their share in overall turnover only
amounts to 8 % (in 1996). Medium-sized
Figure 1
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Source: OECD 1998
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Figure 2
Distribution of employment by firm size: Total 
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Figure 3
Share of SME in German economy (1997)
Source: Hauser 1998
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companies in 1996 represented around 40
% of turnover (but only 19 % of the num-
ber), while in 1970 their share in turnover
had been 45 %. This evolution emphasizes
a tendency towards concentration in turn-
over and underlines the influence of large
enterprises in the German economic sys-
tem.
2.3 Occupation and job creation in
SME
One of the most important arguments in
favor of SME support policies in the last
twenty years was their potential for occu-
pation and job creation. Data, however,
are not always consistent with this argu-
ment since data from different sources
vary widely. According to one source,
which is supposed to have some authority,
in the whole of Germany (in 1997) 22
million employees worked in 1.9 million
enterprises, 31.6 % of them in small (1-19
employees), 49 % in medium-sized (up to
500 employees) and nearly 20 % in large
firms, i.e. no less than 80 % of the em-
ployees find their jobs in SME (IFM 1999:
1-2).
To a certain degree, the creative potential
in German SME has been able to compen-
sate for the job losses in large enterprises.
But keeping the balance was only possible
because of rising job offers in the small
enterprises with up to 20 employees. Be-
tween 1977 and 1997 their share in overall
employment increased from a quarter (26
%) to almost a third (31.6 %). During the
same time the number of jobs in big enter-
prises decreased by 19.2 % (Leicht &
Strohmeyer 1999). This trend is due to the
processes of rationalization, restructuring
and outsourcing in those companies which
start to focus on their core competencies
so as to be more competitive on the na-
tional and international markets. This re-
structuring process also starts in medium-
sized companies.
For the sake of both competitiveness and the
labor market, small and medium-sized enter-
prises will have to increase innovativeness
and size. But the description above also un-
derlines that SME are the most promising bet
in terms of being the job creator in the future,
even though it seems unlikely that they will be
able to compensate for the overall job losses
in the economy.
2.4 Self-employment, start-ups and
liquidations
The ratio of self-employment – the number of
self-employed per 100 employees – and start-
ups are often seen as indicators for the culture
of entrepreneurship in a society. In the public
discussion, especially the start-ups are seen as
the engine and result of structural change,
complementing contraction and expansion of
existing firms. Start-ups increase competitive-
ness and dynamism of the economy, indicate
the emergence of new innovative branches
and are also an indicator of growth and further
potential of job creation.
The rate of self-employment in all early in-
dustrialized countries has stagnated due to in-
herent features of the industrialization process
and increasing wage occupation. However,
there has been an increase in Germany since
the mid-1980s.5 Especially since 1990 the ra-
tio of self-employed has reported ongoing re-
cords in comparison with the last two decades.
In West Germany it increased from 7.3 % (in
1991) to 9.6 % (in 1998) and in the new
Länder from 4.6 % (in 1991) to 7.5 % (in
                                                  
5 In 1990 more than 60 % of the self-employed
persons had employees in their business. This is
the highest ratio among member states of the
OECD (Lageman et al. 1999: 122).
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1997). From 1974 to 1996 the overall
number of enterprises rose by nearly 20 %
(Lageman 1999: 102). Whereas the num-
ber of self-employed persons has stag-
nated in the manufacturing industry, trade,
transport and communication sector since
1970, it has been rising continuously since
1983 in the other economic sectors which
mainly cover other services (Hauser 1998:
15).
Increasing unemployment is one motive
why more persons decide to start their
own business. The increasing number of
start-ups may also indicate that the entre-
preneurial spirit of the population has im-
proved, i.e. that an increasing number of
people in Germany are willing to take the
risks of self-employment. Another impor-
tant factor has been "involuntary self-
employment", i.e. companies forcing their
employees into self-employment to reduce
costs, particularly by saving on social se-
curity contributions; 6 in this respect it is
notable that more than 70 % of new busi-
nesses do not have any employees. Ac-
cording to some studies,  only one quarter
of start-ups are really new enterprises,
whereas three quarters involve part-time
activities apart from the persons’ regular
                                                  
6 The social democratic-green coalition gov-
ernment, which entered office in 1998, has
started to counter this trend by forcing in-
voluntary self-employed to contribute to the
public retirement fund, provided they meet
at least two out of four criteria: no employ-
ees, only one customer, an activity which is
integrated into another company, and de-
pendent relationship rather than market-
mediated transaction. This, however, hit not
only involuntary self-employed, such as
truckers or hairdressers, but also quite vol-
untarily self-employed, such as information
technology professionals. Since there was an
outcry that government is torpedoing its own
entrepreneurship promotion activities, tech-
nical rules have been redefined to some ex-
tent.
employment or involuntary self-employment
(Lageman et al. 1999: 310).
The start-up ratio (number of start-ups relative
to number of enterprises) has doubled since
the 1970s. At the same time, the number of
business liquidations increased. Especially the
SME segment is displaying a high turbulence
in the sense of a high number of start-ups but
also exits. So far, the number of entries ex-
ceeds the number of exits. Even though, some
observers argue that the number of enterprises
has reached a degree of saturation . It will be
more important to see which dynamic sectors
see start-ups with competitive potential. Fo-
cused on the branches, the development
shows an increase of start-ups in modern terti-
ary sectors (Heise et al. 1999: 296).
The start-ups make important contributions to
the German economy in terms of job creation,
innovation and structural change. Especially
in the public discussion the support of start-
ups receives lot of attention because of these
effects. But their influence should not be
overestimated, either. In fact, more than 70 %
of new businesses do not create new jobs ex-
cept for the one of the owner. Among new
enterprises, technology-oriented companies
have a very small share, i.e. only 0.1 % or 0.5
%, depending on the definition of what high-
technology is. For example, among the
530,000 registered new foundations in 1995,
only 300 were technology-based, and up to
2,000 were somehow linked to high-
technology segments (Lageman et al. 1999:
111). There does exist much more potential,
especially in terms of engineers and other
academics in universities and research centers
who might start their own businesses. It is an
important element of support polices to mobi-
lize this potential for new technological based
start-ups. Even though they may not have a
large impact on job creation, they are very
important since they contribute to strength-
ening the dynamic core of the German econ-
omy.
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2.5 Training and qualification
performance of the Mittelstand
The Mittelstand provides approximately
53 % of the gross value added but employs
80 % of all employees. Thus it has to be
assumed that SME produce on average in
a more labor intensive way than large en-
terprises. This comes as no surprise since
the domain of the Mittelstand is not mass
production. Small-scale production and
services require a good qualification of the
labor force, which is one reason for the
fact that the Mittelstand employs 68 % of
all apprentices. In fact, the Mittelstand is
the backbone of the German apprentice-
ship system which is based on a dual vo-
cational training system, where theory is
taught in schools and practical training
takes place inside the company.
Typical fields of activity of the Mittel-
stand, such as crafts, have substantially
increased the number of openings for ap-
prentices since 1990. They thus compen-
sated partially for the overall trend to de-
crease the number of openings for appren-
tices. The highest training intensity –
trainees per employee – is reported in the
construction industry and in the service
sector. In terms of size classifications, the
highest training intensity can be identified
in enterprises with 2 to 19 employees. On
the other hand, the expenditures for further
training are much higher in large enter-
prises.
During the twenty years from 1977 to
1996, the structure of vocational training
in Germany has changed profoundly. The
number of employees without any voca-
tional or university training decreased
from 40 % to 30 %. The larger the enter-
prise, the greater is the share of employees
without vocational training. On-the-job-
training is common in mass production in-
dustries. On the other hand, the larger the
enterprise, the higher is the share of polytech-
nic ("Fachhochschule") and university gradu-
ates, which reflects the needs of large compa-
nies in modern, knowledge-intensive sectors.
The share of higher education graduates in the
labor market doubled from 2.6 to 5.8 % and
was higher in enterprises with more than 50
employees. At the same time, the share of
employees with vocational training increased
from 56 % to 64 %. These figures illustrate
the tendency of increasing qualification within
the economy and reflect the importance and
high regard German enterprises give to dy-
namic advantages like training and qualifica-
tion (IMF 1999b: 1-2).
2.6 The export performance of SME
German exports in 1998 amounted to DM 950
billion, with imports at DM 821 billion. The
main export market for German products is
the European Union (around 75 %), followed
by the USA, Switzerland, and Japan. The
branches with the highest export ratios are the
chemical industry (95 %), the automobile
sector and the manufacturing of electrical and
optical equipment. SME account for 30 % of
the direct exports (i.e. not counting their con-
tribution as suppliers); exports as share of
turnover are lower in small than in large es-
tablishments. A substantial part of small es-
tablishments’ products are traded via whole-
sale trade, and many products of small suppli-
ers are integrated into export products of large
enterprises. No precise data are available for
this kind of export performance.
For SME, the proximity to neighboring coun-
tries plays an important role. For example, a
quarter of the exports from Germany to Swit-
zerland are coming from the bordering region
Baden-Württemberg. The numbers are com-
parable in other border areas (Bopp 1999: 2).
There is a particularly dynamic group of ex-
porting SME which has been called "hidden
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champions" by business writer Hermann
Simon (Simon 1996). He investigated 500
medium-sized enterprises and discovered,
first, that many of them have a world mar-
ket share of up to 90 %, and, second, that
they are mostly unknown. There are vari-
ous success factors:
• On the domestic market they figure
as medium-sized, but they are global
players in their niche.
• Instead of diversifying they concen-
trate on their core business in a nar-
row market niche, where they are
top performers.
• They concentrate on the demand of
their clients, and they are flexible
and innovative.
• Instead of outsourcing they trust in
their own strengths and prefer to
produce in-house.
• Many of them have never been
anything but lean and able to focus
on the essentials. They are long-
term oriented and have suffered re-
markably little influence from man-
agement fads. In their opinion,
buzzwords such as outsourcing,
strategic alliances, and time-based
competition may be either short-
lived fashions or one-sided exag-
gerations of just one aspect of busi-
ness.
7
                                                  
7 One of the entrepreneurs was quoted saying:
"Remain sober and do not flip over the most
recent article on the newest business won-
der-medicine." Another commented: "Those
who are focused beat those who spread
themselves thin." (Simon 1996b: 3)
• Although they tend to have a paternal-
istic and traditional style of leadership,
they focus on a specific aim and are
able to integrate and motivate the em-
ployees.
Even though they are a small group, such hid-
den champions can be found in many cities in
Germany. They produce highly specialized
capital goods, machinery, testing equipment,
pharmaceuticals, and other highly knowledge-
intensive products. They are a kind of élite of
the SME segment.
2.7 SME in the new Länder
The economic structure of the new Länder is
dominated by SME. After reunification, the
formerly planned economy underwent, due to
its low competitiveness, profound structural
change. Large enterprises ("Combinates")
were split up and privatized, or closed down.
Parallel to this process, lots of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises emerged due to the
long-suppressed desire of many citizens to
engage in independent business activities.
This development was encouraged through
strong political support.
A comparison between the size and turnover
structure of the new and old Länder under-
lines the differences. While in East Germany
enterprises with a turnover of less than DM 5
million account for 43 % of overall turnover,
these enterprises only represent 20 % of turn-
over in the West. In other words, in the old
Table 3: Share of the different size groups in the business turnover of West and East Germany (in 1994)
East Germany West Germany
Size Share in turnover (%) Share in turnover (%)
SME / up to DM 5 million p.a. 43 20
SME / up to DM 100 million p.a. 39 28
Large Enterprises 18 52
(Lageman et al. 1999: 145)
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Figure 4
Share of SME in Business R&D
Source: OECD. 
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Länder 0.24 % of all enterprises are large
ones, obtaining more than 50 % of overall
turnover in 1994. In the East, 270 large
enterprises (0.07 % of total) accounted for
only 18 % of overall turnover (Lageman et
al. 1999: 145).
The ratio of self-employment is increasing
more rapidly in the new Länder than in the
old ones as there was a boom of start-ups
after reunification. In 1991 the self-
employment ratio was 4.6 % and rose to
7.5 % in 1997. Despite this increase in the
formation of new businesses since
1990/91, a growing number of exits can be
observed as well. The main reason is the
crisis of the construction industry, which
boomed directly after the unification, and
the shut-down of a many old enterprises,
which frequently proved unable to survive
in the newly competitive environment.
In the East, the service sector and retail
trade account for most small and micro
enterprises. Medium-sized enterprises play
a greater role in the industrial and con-
struction sector and in wholesale trade. In
1994 only the energy sector was domi-
nated by large enterprises. Nearly 6 % of
the enterprises engage in export, mainly to
neighboring countries.
3 The innovation potential and
efforts of SME
This chapter will address the efforts of
German SME in R&D, technology trans-
fer, product and process innovation and
inter-firm cooperation. Quite obviously,
the innovative potential of SME is impor-
tant for Germany’s economic and social
development. Overall indicators are giving
evidence to the modernization and up-
grading of SME. At the same time, it is
also quite obvious that they are fighting an
uphill battle, since technological change is ac-
celerating – not only in the narrow sense of
new process and product technologies, but
also in the wider sense of new concepts for
intra-firm management and the management
of inter-firm relations.
3.1 R&D and technology transfer
In 1995, private sector R&D expenditures in
Germany amounted to 3.7 % of overall turn-
over (DM 57.8 billion). Nearly 90 % of these
resources were used for internal research, and
just one tenth was spent to finance research at
universities and other public research insti-
tutes. However, funding of external research
by firms is growing. The amount spent on
contract research doubled between 1985 to
1995, not least thanks to increasing offers
from a range of intermediary institutes, which
are described in a subsequent chapter. The
share of SME in R&D spending is around 14
%, which is lower than in most other large
OECD countries (Figure 4). It is not only that
more than 80 % of the amount is spent by
large enterprises with more than 500 employ-
ees; actually, their share is rising. Enterprises
with more than 10,000 employees account for
30 % of R&D expenditure.
Measured by the number of annual patent ap-
plications, Germany ranks third in the world,
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behind Japan and the USA. Whereas SME
participation in R&D is relatively low, no
less than 80 % of patent applications in
Germany come from SME. How can this
divergence be explained? The main point
is that a patent is both an indicator for in-
put and output of innovation processes.
Coming up with a new idea is one thing,
and German SME are very strong in this
respect. Pursuing this idea, refining it, and
turning it into a successful product, is an-
other issue. Another aspect is that large
firms tend to have large laboratories,
where most of the private sector R&D
money is spent, whereas the innovative ef-
fort in SME is less organized, and mostly
not organizationally separated and ac-
countable, so that aggregated data tend to
somewhat underestimate the R&D effort
of small firms. And there is the aspect that
a large part of SME are craft firms
("Handwerk") which, as a rule, pursue a
limited innovation effort, and practically
no in-house R&D.
An important detail is that the innovation
efforts of SME are much higher in the new
Länder. Whereas the share of R&D per-
sonal in overall SME employment was 5.8
% in 1995, it was 8.8 % in the East. In the
West as well as in the East, R&D jobs in
SME are especially concentrated in the pro-
ducer services sector and technology-intensive
branches. The development in the East dem-
onstrates that different support programs have
had a positive impact.8
3.2 Product and process innovation in
manufacturing and service sector
SME
The panel data of ZEW (the Center for Euro-
pean Economic Research in Mannheim, Ger-
many) give a statistically representative over-
view of  the innovation effort in German firms
(ZEW 1999a/b). The share of innovation ex-
penditures in the turnover of SME in the
manufacturing sector decreased from 5.6 %
in 1992 to 3.3 % in 1997. This decrease is
mainly the result of insufficient innovation
activities in medium-sized enterprises (200-
500 employees). In the same period, the share
of innovative SME has increased from 56 %
in 1992 and 48 % in 1994 to 65 % in 1997.
However, this increase is mainly the result of
the exit of firms without innovation efforts.
What exactly is behind these tendencies is lit-
tle understood so far. Industry-level studies
                                                  
8 In the East 44 % and in the West 33 % of the
R&D personnel works in enterprise-related
service sectors and technology intensive
branches like medicine-, measurement- and con-
trol technology
Table 4: Innovation performance of SME in manufacturing
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
absolute  % absolute  % absolute  % absolute  % absolute  % absolute  %
Overall SME 69.628 100 68.494 100 67.721 100 62.815 100 61.339 100 60.124 100
Innovating SME 41.139 59 35.239 51 32.804 48 34.443 55 36.423 59 38.949 65
SME employees (thou-
sands)
3.823 100 3.637 100 3.565 100 3.423 100 3.340 100 3.265 100
Innovating SME em-
ployees (thousand)
2.597 68 2.462 68 2.367 66 2.481 72 2.545 76 2.530 77
Innovation expenditure
(DM billion)
46 35 28 31 28 27
Share in turnover in % 5,6 4,3 3,3 3,7 3,3 3,3
Source: ZEW (1999a).
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give some explanation. One observation is
that many medium-sized enterprises find it
difficult to break with traditional man-
agement practices, such as a short-term
orientation as opposed to strategic behav-
ior which includes a more systematic in-
novation effort. Another observation is
that many SME which get into crisis and
then in the red cut their innovative effort
(rather than expand it to be more competi-
tive in the future – short-term survival is
more important than long-term competi-
tiveness). Moreover, many SME errone-
ously believe that their technology is
leading-edge anyway so that slowing
down efforts to improve on it is tolerable.
A new orientation, a model of creating and
introducing new products and services
based on identified customer needs rather
than on the preferences of a firm’s engi-
neers, is only slowly gaining ground. The
so-called hidden champions are the suc-
cessful examples that have been able to
keep this in mind or that have gone
through a successful restructuring process.
At the same time, it is possible to rule out
a number of possible explanations. The
innovation effort of manufacturing SME is
not systematically hampered by certain
types of market failures. The technology
market appears to work reasonably well.
Enforcement of intellectual property rights
does not pose major problems. Access to
new technologies, in the shape of new
equipment or blueprints and patents, is not
particularly complicated, either. Informa-
tion exchange between firms, including
exchange between large firms and SME, is
working well. Mobility of employees may
be somewhat lower than in other coun-
tries, since employment is traditionally
more stable in Germany than in other
OECD countries, but there is no indication
that SME are facing major obstacles in re-
cruiting highly qualified employees. Nu-
merous associations and organizations are
fostering information exchange (see below); if
anything, there is rather an over-supply of in-
formation and promotion, which may create
substantial transaction costs regarding trans-
parency of information, the effort involved in
applying for subsidies, and reporting require-
ments once a firm has obtained some kind of
financial support.
All in all, the innovation effort in the German
service sector is stable, although contrasting
developments have to be mentioned. On the
one hand, the innovation activities in modern
branches of the service sector – like banks, in-
surance, technical services, consultancy,
services in data processing – are intensified.
On the other hand, in the traditional areas of
the service sector – like transport, retail and
wholesale trade – process and product inno-
vation decreased strongly.
According to the panel data, the number of
innovative enterprises in the modern branches
of the service sectors increased more than the
overall number of enterprises in this branch.9
The contrasting development also becomes
obvious in the ratio of innovation expendi-
ture/turnover. Between 1995 and 1997 it was
constantly 1.3 % despite the fact that the en-
terprises in trade and transport decreased their
ratio by as much as 10 %. This tendency will
continue due to the economic crisis of the re-
tail sector. On the other hand, the modern
branches have increased their effort by 15 %
so that their ratio now is 2.5 % (without banks
and insurance). Compared to the innovation
ratio in the manufacturing industry (5 %) it is
still low, but this reflects the generic features
                                                  
9 According to the research of ZEW the number of
innovative enterprises in the modern segment in-
creased from 1996 to 1997 from 160,000 to
163,000, while it decreased in the traditional
segment between 1994 to 1997 from 145,000 to
122,000 (ZEW 1999a: 3).
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of the service sector, as does the much
smaller average size of firms.
The different structure and development of
the modern and traditional branch of the
service sector becomes also obvious with
respect to SME, although the total number
of firms between 1994 and 1997 was con-
stant. But in trade and transport the num-
ber of innovative firms decreased by 5 %,
whereas the number of enterprises in the
modern branches increased by 6 %.10
Service SME innovation expenditure in-
creased continuously to DM 26 billion.
Large enterprises, which account for 2 %
of the total number, spent DM 20 billion
on innovation.
3.3 Innovation in supplier networks
and cooperative relationships
As a result of the globalization process
and the more knowledge-intensive pro-
duction needs, cooperation between SME,
and between SME and large enterprises, is
perceived as increasingly important today.
In the research debate, the phenomenon of
clusters and industrial districts in countries
like Italy received a lot of attention and
underlined the importance of different
forms of cooperation and supplier rela-
tions.11
Regarding relations between firms, one
can distinguish between horizontal and
vertical relations. German industry is
characterized mainly by vertical supplier
relations. Densely vertically integrated
production clusters can be found in differ-
                                                  
10 The number of SME decreased in the tradi-
tional sector from 228,000 to 216,000, while
it increased in the modern branches from
150,000 to 160,000 (ZEW 1999b).
11 Cf. Piore and Sabel (1984), Porter (1990),
Sengenberger and Pyke (1992).
ent regions in Germany. One of the famous
regions in this respect is Baden-Württemberg,
where mechanical engineering, automobile
production and electrical engineering form the
backbone of the regional economy. Although
the region is often addressed as the stronghold
of SME, the share of employment in large
companies is above the average of all West
German Länder (Semlinger 1995: 17). Two
different paths developed independently, but
later inter-linked: on the one hand, the devel-
opment of a centralized and large-enterprise
dominated automobile industry; there is an
elaborate supplier network of special large
enterprises. On the other hand, there is a de-
centralized Mittelstand economy, which is
very prominent in machine tool manufactur-
ing. The cluster structure in Baden-Württem-
berg is often quoted as an example of flexible
specialization of SME suppliers. It also dem-
onstrates quite impressively how, by means of
vertical inter-firm cooperation, small firms
can improve their competitiveness and how a
region can develop its innovative potential.
But, again, in Baden-Württemberg as well as
in other economically important Länder (e.g.
North Rhine-Westphalia / NRW), the pre-
dominant model is one of mainly vertical co-
ordination of supplier relations by a few large
enterprises.12
In fact, NRW is the most important supplier
location in Germany for the automobile sec-
tor, with more than 200,000 employees and
around 800 suppliers, even though only two
final assembly plants are located in the Land.
Only 5 % of the produced supplier parts are
used in NRW whereas 65 % is delivered to
other Länder in Germany and 30 % to other
countries within the European Union. Coop-
eration initiatives like the VIA NRW (Ver-
bundinitiative Automobil NRW), initiated and
supported by the State Ministry of Economics,
                                                  
12 E.g. Staber (1996), Herrigel (1993), Heidenreich
and Krauss (1996), Kremer (1999).
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encourage the cooperation between sup-
pliers and large enterprises. Similar initia-
tives can be found in other Länder as well
(MWMTV 2000: 1).
The emergence of such initiatives reflects
the attempt to increase the competitiveness
of regional enterprises, but also the reac-
tion to structural change in inter-firm rela-
tions during the last decade. Especially in
industry, large enterprises became global
players and started global sourcing. There-
fore they reduced their reliance on local or
other domestic suppliers. Especially in the
automobile industry, the implementation
of lean manufacturing practices went
hand-in-hand with global sourcing.
Moreover, large enterprises relocated part
of their production activities to low-wage
countries. Some large suppliers were able
to gain space, establishing themselves as
globally preferred suppliers. SME were
downgraded in the supplier hierarchy as a
result of large firms conducting a selection
process and a reduction of the number of
suppliers. Accordingly, expectations of
new market potentials for small and me-
dium-sized suppliers in the industrial sec-
tor through a reduction of vertical integra-
tion and outsourcing mostly did not mate-
rialize.
The situation is different with respect to
producer services. Small enterprises in
particular benefited from outsourcing ac-
tivities in this segment. Large enterprises
outsourced simple services like cleaning,
but also highly qualified consulting serv-
ices and data-processing and telecommu-
nication activities.
While vertical cooperation plays an im-
portant role in Germany, horizontal coop-
eration between SME is relatively weak.
"Italianate" industrial districts do not
really exist in Germany. There are no em-
pirical data which would indicate that the
intensity of cooperation between SME has re-
cently increased in comparison to earlier dec-
ades. Yet some learning processes can be de-
scribed. For example, industrial support pro-
grams of public and private institutions in Ba-
den-Württemberg (Ministry of Economics, the
Steinbeis Foundation and the Landesgewer-
beamt) intensified their efforts to promote in-
ter-firm and inter-institutional cooperation and
had some success (Semlinger 1991: 24ff).
In general, German SME keep their distance
from other companies in their respective sec-
tor. But this does not mean that horizontal co-
operation is negligible in Germany. The oppo-
site is the case. The highly developed institu-
tional infrastructure reduces the necessity and
importance of direct cooperation between
SME. In the following chapter we will elabo-
rate that institutions like the vocational train-
ing system, the efficient work of chambers
and employers’ associations as well as their
high membership reflect a strong division of
labor and cooperation. This form of coopera-
tion is highly institutionalized and is different
from the kind of collaboration that has been
described for Italian industrial districts. When
you ask a German SME owner about coop-
eration between SME, it is not uncommon that
he will deny its existence because collabora-
tion in vocational training, of associations and
chambers is self-evident in his eyes.
At the same time, more direct cooperation
between SME might still set free a great deal
of innovation potential . In this respect it is
interesting to observe that some authors of re-
cent studies argue that direct cooperation be-
tween SME is more intense in East Germany.
They ascribe this phenomenon to the crisis
and the end of the influence of the old cen-
tralized conglomerates, which often hindered
interaction. On the one hand, there are mainly
weak enterprises, which have to cooperate in
order to survive. On the other hand, higher
horizontal cooperation in the East is based on
dense informal networks which go back to the
BEHIND THE MYTH OF THE MITTELSTAND ECONOMY 21
German Democratic Republic and are now
changing to formal relations in the course
of the democratization process (Lageman
et al. 1999: 292).
4 The institutional framework
for SME support
When SME produce more complex prod-
ucts, they tend to place high demands on
the institutional environment at the mu-
nicipal, regional and national levels. Pub-
lic and private actors have, individually
and jointly, created all kinds of support in-
stitutions. Germany has a highly differen-
tiated system of organizations and institu-
tions which support SME at different lev-
els. More recently, the socio-political sys-
tem has been experiencing the emergence
of new forms of organization and govern-
ance.
In this section we will portray some im-
portant organizations which are working
as intermediaries between government and
entrepreneurs. It is only a selection of or-
ganizations; we have tried to identify those
which are particularly relevant. It is im-
possible to portray all existing institutions.
Due to the increasing attention which was
given to SME in the last three decades,
hundreds of support programs were intro-
duced and more than 1000 organizations
work in the field of economic support,
mostly in a decentralized way. This may
be one of the most important features of
the development in SME policies during
the last thirty years.
4.1 Government regulation and "Labor
Constraint" on Price Competition:
Understanding the consensus model
in labor relations
What has not changed, though, is that the
governance patterns (public or private) are
often blurred. The way many German institu-
tions operate can only be explained by the
existence of a basic consensus between the
private and public sector as well as between
unions and employers associations, i.e. by
their preference for a social market economy
and a problem-solving oriented style of nego-
tiations. Therefore it will be important to
mention some factors which shape the com-
paratively constructive relationship between
the state, the employers and employees in
Germany. There are especially three compo-
nents which on the one hand make coordina-
tion between the different actors necessary
and on the other hand reduce the extent of
wage-based competition. The latter, in con-
trast, is quite typical of newly industrialized
countries with more flexible labor markets.
One of the major features of the German po-
litical economy is the strength of regulatory
constraints on employers, including SME,13 in
the remuneration, use and dismissal of labor.
This "labor constraint" includes binding in-
dustry-wide agreements over wages and
working conditions, a high level of mandatory
or state-provided social security benefits and
substantial constraints on layoffs (Vitols
1996: 2). The first major component is the
extensive set of legally binding sectoral col-
lective bargaining agreements between trade
unions and employers’ associations. In 1996,
more than 30,000 collective bargaining
agreements were registered (only a few of
which had been really negotiated in negotia-
                                                  
13 There is, in fact, an unwritten rule that the presi-
dent of the National Federation of Employers’
Associations comes from a Mittelstand com-
pany.
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tion districts, while the vast majority were
adoptions of the first agreements). Fur-
thermore, as early as in the Republic of
Weimar in the 1920s, labor law gave ex-
tended effect to collective bargaining
agreements to all employers in a sector
(Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung).
When employers accounting for at least 50
% of the employees in an industry belong
to an employers’ association, collective
bargaining agreements between the union
and this association may be declared le-
gally binding by the Labor Ministry on all
companies in the sector. An estimated 90
% of all employees in industry are covered
by such collective bargaining agreements;
in contrast with the experience in most
other industrialized countries where union
influence has weakened, this proportion
did not decrease during the 1980s.
One indicator of the strength of the labor
constraint on employee compensation is
the low level of wage differentiation in
Germany, which reflects low variation in
wage rates across firms in industries and
moderate wage gaps between semi-skilled
and skilled workers on the one hand and
production and non-production workers on
the other. Employees in the lowest earn-
ings decile received 65 % of the earnings
of the fifth decile as compared to 61 % for
Japan, 59 % for the UK and 40 % for the
U.S. (Vitols 1996: 4, Streeck 1996). In the
1980s Germany was the only OECD
country where wage differentiation be-
came less pronounced. This is especially
important for small and medium-sized
firms. Wages in small firms in Germany
are only about 10 to 15 % lower than in
large firms, compared to 20 to 25 % in the
UK and France, and 30 % in the USA.
This means that competition based on la-
bor cost is restricted for SME, which, in
turn, generates a "productivity whip"
(Meidner 1974) on companies, particularly
export oriented SME. As a result, less pro-
ductive firms are forced to modernize or go
out of business.
A second component of the labor constraint is
the great degree to which non-wage costs are
determined by mandatory or publicly pro-
vided "fringe benefits". Unemployment bene-
fits and state pensions, which are financed
through mandatory contributions, are gener-
ous in comparison. Social security contribu-
tions as a percentage of income in Germany
are among the highest among major OECD
countries. Minimum service levels are set and
fees regulated for health insurance, which is
also co-financed by employer and employee.
Since the early 1960s, employers have also
been required to fully finance 100 % of net
pay for six weeks in case of illness.
Whereas the collective bargaining model is
based on the supra-firm level, the third com-
ponent of the consensus-encouraging mecha-
nism inside the firm is the strong legal rights
granted to works councils that represent em-
ployees at the shop-floor level. These works
councils have wide-ranging information, con-
sultation, and co-determination rights, in-
cluding rights in the areas of introduction of
new technology and workplace organization,
hiring and firing, and overtime and short-time
work. Employees in any firm with more than
50 employees are entitled to establish a works
council, and there is a rule which establishes
that , in proportion to the number of employ-
ees, a certain number of employees can dedi-
cate themselves full-time to works council
matters.
The ability of works councils to influence in-
dustrial adjustment were considerably ex-
tended in the 1972 revision of the Works Con-
stitution Act; this reform granted works coun-
cils the right to be informed of impending
mass layoffs and to negotiate social plans
regulating mass layoffs. Social plans (Sozial-
pläne) cover employer obligations for re-
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training, redeployment to other plants or
subsidiaries of the firm, for severance pay
and early retirement pensions. As a result
of these rights, works councils can effec-
tively constrain employers to quickly re-
duce the workforce through restructuring
or during downturns in demand.
In summary, the three mentioned compo-
nents of labor regulation constrain the ex-
tent to which employers can pursue price-
competition strategies. This pressure is es-
pecially high on SME, which in other
countries overcome some of their disad-
vantages in comparison to large firms with
lower labor costs and greater flexibility in
the use of labor. At the same time, these
constraints encourage high-quality com-
petition through modernization at the firm
level. Moreover, they encouraged and
forced the private actors to form collective
bargaining and consensus-building struc-
tures (Vitols 1996: 5).
4.2 Training and research
institutions
Research and training institutions like the
dual vocational training system, the infra-
structure of higher education institutions
(universities and Fachhochschulen), and
specialized R&D institutions play a key
role in Germany’s competitive advantage re-
garding the production of high-quality and
internationally recognized manufactured
goods. Training and research depends on a set
of socio-economic institutions like banks,
collective bargaining institutions, and others
that encourage and support long-term com-
mitments by labor and capital. Its high output
of skilled and well-educated employees and
engineers is widely recognized as the basis for
Germany’s export success and innovation.
4.2.1. The dual vocational training
system
The apprenticeship system is the major pro-
vider of vocational training in Germany. The
German model of high quality production is
highly dependent on it. It provides compre-
hensive theoretical and practical training
through the "dual system" for about 70 % of
German adolescents, typically of an age be-
tween 15 and 20 years (Wagner 1998: 2).
Most of them (85 %) enter the apprenticeship
after nine or ten years of schooling, whereas
around 15 % have already passed 13 years of
schooling which provide the university en-
trance certificate. The final certificate of ap-
prenticeship is accepted as an important career
step in Germany. The first degree usually
takes three years of dual learning, i.e. theo-
retical instruction at public vocational schools
Table 5: Percentage of plants with apprentice training according to industry in West Germany
Industry Plants offering training in % of all plants
(1995)
Metal working 33.6
Precision engineering, optics,
watches
34.7
Leather, textile, food 32.6
Trade 16.9
Traffic, communication 10.3
Banks, insurance 18.8
Services 24.1
Total 23.7
Source: Wagner (1998: 21)
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and practical training within the enter-
prises. Afterwards, skilled workers who
want to continue their career have two op-
tions: Either they take and pass a Meister
(supervisor / instructor) or technician ex-
amination after at least two years of expe-
rience or they go to university for further
studies.
Meister exams have been developed for
different industrial and craft areas. A great
variety of other further education with
similar reputation exists in other sectors.
This kind of career is an important incen-
tive for better qualified young people to
enter the dual system as they can move
into supervisory or middle management
positions without having to complete the
time-consuming and demanding higher
educational track. Under German law, the
Meister certificate is even a prerequisite to
manage a craft business. The latter is an
important reason for the high quality
reputation of the German craft sector and
its products and services. About 20 % of
apprenticeship graduates subsequently
pursue a Meister or a technician training.
(Wagner 1998: 24)
The German vocational system is based on
cooperation and consent by employers,
trade unions, and the government. In 1995,
24 % of enterprises provided apprentice-
ships (Table 5).
The apprenticeship training system is su-
pervised by the chambers. They are also
responsible for the examinations. At the
same time the chambers, trade unions and
employer associations manage external
training centers which offer training mod-
ules that the companies themselves cannot
provide. The state also supports the estab-
lishment of these centers and thus makes
up for a market failure or fills a gap in a
company’s training capacity.
The vocational system is based on cooperation
between the different actors which secures a
reasonable relationship between demand and
supply at the market for apprenticeship posts.
Accordingly, the supply of apprenticeship
places has historically closely followed de-
mand in recent history in West Germany.14
Especially the elastic reaction of the system is
often mentioned as a very positive feature,
although the imbalance between demand and
supply has increased in the 1990s. In the last
decade the pressures have shifted from the
demand-side (not enough young people seek-
ing to fill apprentice openings between 1990
and 1992) to the supply-side (not enough ap-
prenticeship places since 1993). Statistical
analysis shows that the vast majority of these
changes can be explained by demographic
changes and structural changes in the econ-
omy (Wagner 1998: 26). However, there is an
ongoing debate about the lack of flexibility
within the system.
In this respect, the sluggish reaction of the
system to the emergence of new types of jobs,
for instance in the multimedia sector, is worth
mentioning. There is a straightforward prob-
lem behind: The structure of the apprentice-
ship system, including the type of training
profiles offered, is negotiated between cham-
bers, employers' associations, and trade un-
ions. New industries, such as multimedia, tend
to have a low degree of organization at both
the employers' and employees' side. There-
fore, the well-established system does not
                                                  
14 After reunification chambers had to be built up
in the new federal states. Trade unions and em-
ployers’ associations moved to East Germany
and helped to set up the new system. For further
compensation of existing deficits in the training
facilities, external training centers were insti-
tuted with a high financial public support. De-
spite this transfer of institutions the number of
apprenticeship places is not yet sufficient but
adjustments to the West German working envi-
ronment are taking place in the new federal
states.
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work adequately in such sectors. The per-
verse result is that jobs which would under
normal circumstances cater to individuals
with an appropriate apprenticeship degree
are being filled with university graduates,
who have gone through a much more
time-consuming training and acquired
various sorts of skills which they cannot
use in such a job. In other words, the
whole system works excellently in routine
situations but has inherent problems in
cases of radical change.
4.2.2. Universities, Polytechnics
and Colleges
Since the beginning of the 19th century the
universities have been playing an impor-
tant role both in the provision of qualified
personnel and in scientific research.
Whereas the traditional universities con-
centrate on pure research, the technical
universities or polytechnics engage in a
more application-oriented research. Since
there is a need for more engineers and
higher technical skills, a high number of
colleges and polytechnics (Fach-
hochschulen) has emerged since the be-
ginning of the 1970s. The Fach-
hochschulen were initially closely oriented
towards the economic sectors of the re-
spective region and their need of engi-
neers. They still focus on education and
technical skills rather than on theory and re-
search.
At the end of the 1990s, around 1.9 million
students were enrolled at 113 universities, 46
universities of arts and 114 Fachhochschulen
or similar institutions. Research and education
are mainly financed by the Länder, whereas
the participation of the private sector in-
creased from 3 % to 8.2 % between 1982 and
1997. The universities and Fachhochschulen
spend around 14 billion DM p.a. for R&D. 29
% of these expenditures is spent on natural
sciences, followed by medicine (23.4 %), so-
cial sciences (20.7 %) and engineering science
(20.3 %) (Stamm 1999: 17).
The organizational structure of German uni-
versities is important for an understanding of
the research and transfer system. The various
schools (faculties) are the major bodies in
charge of the distribution of institutional funds
for teaching and research. These schools
comprise a number of chairs responsible for
different areas of teaching. Several chairs of-
ten establish institutes where the professors
organize research. The status of theses insti-
tutes varies widely from completely inde-
pendent institutes to closely linked ones. Of-
ten the institutes’ research is financed and per-
formed jointly with the promoting organiza-
tions (Spielkamp & Vopel 1997: 17).
It is important to note that there is little dis-
pute that German universities are in urgent
Table 6: The five institutional columns of public financed R&D infrastructure
Institution Helmholtz
Centers
Max Planck
institutes
Leibniz institutes
(Blue List)
Fraunhofer Ge-
sellschaft
German Re-
search Council
Number of fa-
cilities
16 80 82 47 1
Personnel ~ 23,000 ~ 11,000 ~ 10,000 ~ 9,000
Research profile Basic research Basic research R&D and Serv-
ice institutions
without clear
profile
Applied research
and development
central public
funding organi-
zation for aca-
demic research
Source: Stamm (1999: 20)
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need of reform. "Freedom of science" and
performance supervision used to be played
against each other, with the latter losing
out. It was only recently that performance
indicators have been introduced. Never-
theless, the university professor who
reaches tenure cannot be dismissed or suf-
fer other types of sanctions in case of in-
adequate performance. Accordingly, the
performance varies widely, and overall
quality has suffered, even more so since
the substantial expansion of the number of
students has not been accompanied by a
parallel expansion of teaching staff.
4.2.3. Public and private research
organizations
a) Public research institutions
All over Germany there are 225 publicly
funded research institutes which belong to
four groups of research centers. Apart
from the universities these institutes and
the German Research Council (Deutsche
Forschungsgesellschaft, DFG ) constitute
the five columns of the publicly financed
institutional R&D infrastructure in Ger-
many.
The Max Planck Society is a sponsoring
organization and comprises institutes all
over –ermany (with 27 institutes located in
the new federal Länder). It was created as
the "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft" about a
hundred years ago. The MPG is mainly
engaged in basic research in selected areas
of natural science, but also in law, social
sciences, and arts. The Society picks up
especially new, promising research topics
which have not yet met with adequate re-
sponse at universities. The MPG cooper-
ates with universities and provides them
with major appliances. The expenditures
in 1995 amounted to DM 1,708 million.
Overall staff amounts to 11,500 employees,
among them 3,015 scientists.
The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (FhG) is a non-
profit organization with 47 institutes for ap-
plied research all over the country and a total
staff of around 9,000, most of them scientists
and engineers. International collaboration is
promoted through Fraunhofer branches in the
USA and in Asia. Carrying out contract re-
search projects for the business and the public
sector, the FhG contributes to transfer results
of basic research into practice. The institu-
tional promotion by the federal government
and the Länder, which usually amounts to 20
% of the total budget of a given institute, en-
ables the FhG to address self-chosen research
topics for securing their scientific potential
and the development of new technologies and
their constant observation. The FhG offers
firms and public authorities its services in dif-
ferent areas, among others in microelectron-
ics, process engineering, environment, and
health. The close relationship to universities is
institutionalized through the joint appointment
of Fraunhofer directors as tenured university
professors.
The Helmholtz Centers, like most of the other
research facilities, are mainly financed by the
federal government and especially by the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research. The
special aim of each of the 16 Helmholtz Cen-
ters research is to use large-scale equipment
with a focus on specific priority topics, pri-
marily large accelerators, neutron and syn-
chrotron sources, as well as observatories and
telescopes. In research projects and as part-
ners for universities and other research insti-
tutes the Helmholtz Centers contribute sig-
nificantly to long-term basic research in sev-
eral fields of natural sciences.
Next to the major research facilities of the
Max Planck Society and the Fraunhofer Soci-
ety, the federal government and the Länder
together promote research facilities and fa-
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cilities with a service function. The "Blue
List" contains more than 80 facilities
which are also addressed as the "Leibniz
Society". These research institutions are
not a uniform group. At the end of the
1980s there were 15 institutions with
service functions like museums and spe-
cial libraries, 15 social science institutions
and 16 research institutions in natural sci-
ence, engineering science and medicine.
After German unification the number of
"Blue List" institutes increased strongly to
82. In contrast to the earlier mentioned so-
cieties, which have some kind of common
philosophy, the Leibniz Society comprises
otherwise unrelated institutions. Around
23,000 people worked in these organiza-
tions in 1998.
The German Research Council (DFG) is
the major promoting organization and self-
government for science and research ac-
tivities in Germany. One of its main tasks
is financial support for research projects,
support for research cooperations, and the
promotion of junior researchers. Moreover
it is an important advisor in terms of sci-
ence policy-making. The DFG also devel-
ops and maintains the relations to and co-
operates with international research insti-
tutions (Spielkamp & Vopel 1997: 16 ff).
b) Privately organized industrial research
organizations
Industry-wide R&D exists in industrial re-
search organizations mainly according to
the different economic sectors in Ger-
many. Both industry associations, which
are responsible for promoting the interests
of companies in a sector as a whole, and
professional associations, which represent
engineers in at present 107 such organiza-
tions, are assembled under the umbrella of
the Working Group of Industrial Research
Organizations (Arbeitsgemeinschaft industri-
eller Forschungsvereinigungen, AiF). AiF
promotes applied research and development
mainly to support small and medium-sized
firms. Since this organization keeps a spirit of
community and common interest, the activi-
ties focus on industries and branches. It re-
ceives joint funding from the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Industry.
4.2.4. SME and R&D
SME are much less likely to interact with
R&D institutions than large firms (Figure 5
and 6). The opposite might be expected since
large firms can afford there own R&D labo-
ratories, whereas SME suffer from lack of
scale and indivisibilities in this respect.
Probably the main reason why things are as
they are is that company laboratories are a
kind of half-way house between private busi-
ness organizations and research institutions,
and find it therefore quite easy to communi-
cate with the latter, whereas SME have to
cope with all the structural obstacles to inter-
action between business and research, which
stem from secrecy vs. publication interests
and short- vs. long-term orientation. On the
other hand, if research institutions operate in a
business-like way, the structural obstacles
may vanish, only to be substituted by a new
obstacle, namely the relatively high cost of
their services. Even though policy-makers are
aware of the problem, their efforts to involve
SME more in R&D programs had only a lim-
ited effect (Figure 7). There are, nevertheless,
ongoing efforts at all levels, i.e. by Länder
and federal governments as well as the EU, to
adjust policy instruments in order to foster
collaboration between SME and research in-
stitutions.
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Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
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4.2.5. The Steinbeis Foundation
One of the remarkable success stories in
terms of SME-related innovation net-
working is the Steinbeis Foundation in
Baden-Württemberg. Its foundation dates
back to the 1960s and 1970s. During this
time universities of applied science
(Fachhochschulen, FHS) were established.
This gave rise to another idea: to set up a
central service agency to supply know-
how to SME, linking them with FHS. To
fulfill this purpose, the Steinbeis Founda-
tion for Economic Promotion was estab-
lished in 1971. It started as a private-law
foundation with five so-called Technical
Consulting Services. These centers,
headed by professors from FHS in the re-
gion, worked as general points of contact
for technology-oriented questions and
problems, particularly from small and me-
dium-sized companies. Because of its suc-
cessful work, the Foundation became a
member of the Government Commission
for Technology Transfer at the beginning
of the 1980s. Based on government sup-
port, the Foundation added to the existing
facilities a network of around 270 Stein-
beis Transfer Centers. As a rule, each of
these Centers is specialized in a specific
topical focus in accordance with the needs
of the regional economy.
The Steinbeis Foundation works as an in-
termediary institution for technology
transfer between the government and uni-
versities / FHS on the one side and indus-
try on the other. It receives little institu-
tional grants and finances itself to the tune
of 96 %. Even though the Foundation does
not depend financially on the government,
close cooperation is advisable as the in-
stitution is often perceived as an opera-
tional unit of the state anyway, namely be-
cause the chairman of the board of the
Foundation is at the same the Government
Commissioner for Technology Transfer in
Baden-Württemberg.
The Foundation calls itself a service enterprise
since the centers are organized as profit cen-
ters, which finance themselves through proj-
ects with SME. The Foundation has no R&D
infrastructure of its own. It rather operates as
a matchmaker between enterprises seeking
technological support and universities and
FHS. Projects are often short-term, addressing
immediate problems of enterprises, and in
many cases the fees amount to no more than $
3,000 - 5,000.
To secure efficient technology transfer the
centers are dispersed all over the state. The
internal organizational structure somewhat re-
sembles a franchise system, with a network
structure between centers as an additional
element to mobilize know-how. Steinbeis
centers offer consulting, applied R&D, further
education and expertise regarding all sorts of
enterprises issues. More precisely, in terms of
consulting they offer project-, information-,
cooperation- and quality-management (as well
as certification), strategies to optimize busi-
ness organization, market analysis and diver-
sification. In applied R&D they support prod-
uct and prototype development and optimiza-
tion. They also advise local and regional pub-
lic actors within technology and incubator
centers or economic promotion agencies.
4.2.6. The Center of Innovation and
Technology in North Rhine-
Westphalia (ZENIT)
Another example of an institution that pro-
motes innovation in SME is the Center of In-
novation and Technology in North Rhine-
Westphalia, ZENIT. It is a technology-
oriented consultancy company which was
founded in 1984, largely on private initiative.
It is owned by the Ministry of Economics of
the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, a bank-
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ing consortium which comprises the State
Bank of North Rhine-Westphalia as well
as private banks, and a private association
which unites about 170 companies. It has
about 50 employees and the annual turn-
over amounts to about DM 10 million. Its
mission is to facilitate support for SME,
especially in technical and technological
areas.
Apart from technology transfer, ZENIT is
also engaged in the fields of marketing
and management consultancy. Here the
focus is on market research, consultancy
services in marketing, quality management
issues and employee training as well as
opportunities to obtain public funding. The
center offers strategy advice regarding en-
try into other European markets, like
identification of potential cooperation
partners in other EU countries, informa-
tion on EU legislation, and information
regarding environmental and communica-
tion technologies (like Eco-Audit for SME
or Internet representations and cooperation
exchanges).
At the same time ZENIT is one of more
than 30 Euro-Info-Centers (EIC) in Ger-
many, which inform, coordinate and en-
courage SME to get access to EU support
programs.15 ZENIT develops its own
technology and restructuring projects with
its members as part of main support ac-
tions of the EU Framework Programs for
R&D. Within the main action "Sustainable
Management and Quality of Water" of the
Fifth Framework Program (1999 to 2002),
for instance, ZENIT encourages projects
                                                  
15 Other EIC are integrated in chambers, state
or house banks. The European funding pro-
grams in the areas of innovative products,
processes and organization for SME are in-
tegrated in the Fifth Framework Program for
research, technological development and
demonstration activities (1998-1992),
www.cordis.lu, or www.zenit.de.
like the mentioned Eco-Audit Model Manual
for SME, integrated approaches for the man-
agement of water resources or technologies
for the monitoring and prevention of pollu-
tion, etc.
4.3 Technology centers and incubators
(TGZ)
The numerous discussions about securing
Germany as a location for industry often em-
phasized that founding technology-based
firms can make an especially important con-
tribution to securing the international com-
petitiveness of the economy. Since the early
1980s, an increasing number of support pro-
grams has been directed towards these enter-
prises. This was triggered by observations
made in the USA, particularly in Massachu-
setts and in Silicon Valley. Other contributing
factors were the discussion, arising at about
the same time, on Europe’s tendency to fall
behind in the international technology race.
Technology centers and incubators (TGZ) to-
day are one of the most popular instruments of
economic and technology support at the local
level (Kulicke 1997, Sternberg et al. 1996).
There has been a real "boom" in the creation
of such centers. The first TGZ was founded in
1983, by 1999 there were more than 200 all
over Germany, and some Länder were just
about to set them up.
The basic concept of a TGZ is to create favor-
able framework conditions for start-ups, espe-
cially innovative and technology-oriented
firms, including the stimulation of contacts
between new enterprises and research insti-
tutes, technology transfer institutions, banks,
insurance companies and consulting opportu-
nities. The long-term goal is to improve the
regional innovation potential from the bottom
up, with synergy effects like the creation of
qualified jobs and the attraction of other inno-
vative enterprises (FES 1993: 7).
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The foundation of the centers can be seen
as a recognition of the disadvantages
which young research-intensive firms are
facing in the German economy. Although
there exists a potential for innovation,
there is a lack of finance and knowledge of
start-ups and of the transformation of a
promising idea into a successful product.
The centers offer space at a lower than the
going rate. They also offer common fa-
cilities and technical services like confer-
ence rooms, photocopying machines, sec-
retary offices, telephone offices or labo-
ratories, and telecommunication services.
The manager of the center offers contact
and cooperation arrangements with banks,
external consulting firms for product and
marketing innovation, market analysis, in-
vestment planning or support in personnel
and technology transfer with universities
or other research institutes.
Regarding the financial and organizational
structure of TGZs, it is important to dis-
tinguish between the construction and op-
erating costs. There are further differences
between the TGZs in East and West Ger-
many. While in West Germany one third
of the construction costs was financed by
Länder, cities, banks and other private or-
ganizations (especially the chambers), in
the East more than 50 % are financed by
the federal government due to the financial
problems of the new Länder and their cit-
ies after the reunification (Sternberg et al.
1996: 64). Private institutions and banks
hardly contributed to the construction
costs in the East.
The TGZs are usually organized as limited
liability companies (GmbH). They are
jointly owned by different institutions like
local government, chambers, banks, uni-
versities and research institutes as well as
local and regional economic promotion
agencies; in the mid-1990s, only 11 % of
the TGZs were exclusively government-
owned (Sternberg et al. 1996, p. 52). The con-
struction of TGZs is usually funded by the
government, especially through regional de-
velopments programs.
4.4 Industrial engineering organ-
izations: RKW and REFA
The Board for Rationalization of the German
Economy (RKW) was founded in 1921 and is
supported by the Länder and the federal gov-
ernment. Its task is to support the increase in
productivity and employment in SME. RKW
offers information mediation, consultancy and
diagnostic measures for best practice in or-
ganization and outsourcing.
To combine employment creation and pro-
ductivity increases, a guiding principle of
RKW is to increase the awareness regarding
the importance of continuous learning for em-
ployees and employers. RKW organizes a va-
riety of training courses inside and outside
firms, conferences, fairs, events for business
cooperation, and Internet forums on specific
issues. The members of the RKW also
founded an innovation center in Berlin as a
discussion platform for scientific, social, po-
litical end economic actors regarding new
concepts in the field of productivity and em-
ployment. The aim is to encourage a network
of multipliers in the development of support
policies which combine employment and pro-
ductivity approaches.
REFA (Institute of Work Study Practitioners)
was founded in 1924. It is a private associa-
tion with about 40,000 members, among them
1,600 firms. Many of its activities are run by
volunteers in the 150 chapters which exist all
over the country. Initially, its focus was on
scientific management, following Taylorist
principles. REFA has established itself as a
major provider of training activities in this
field, and a REFA certificate used to be a
valuable asset for engineers and technicians in
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search of attractive, well-paying jobs.
More recently REFA has broadened its fo-
cus, addressing industrial engineering is-
sues in a more comprehensive way.
RKW and REFA offer skills which are
highly relevant for firms. Large companies
can set up in-house training facilities and
are therefore less dependent on external
providers of training courses. Accordingly,
RKW and REFA are particularly relevant
for SME.
4.5 Banks with special focus on SME
Germany has a large number of financial
institutions. Large banks, such as Deut-
sche Bank or Dresdner Bank, mainly cater
to large enterprises. But there are other in-
stitutes which support the Mittelstand.
They act at different levels, according to
their historical background. At the local
and regional levels there are public sav-
ings banks ("Sparkassen") and credit co-
operatives ("Volksbanken und Raif-
feisenkassen"), at the Länder level there
are collateral guarantee banks, and at the
national level there are the Bank for Re-
construction (Kreditanstalt für Wiederauf-
bau, KfW) and the Deutsche Aus-
gleichsbank (DtA).
• Publicly organized savings and co-
operative banks are the main fi-
nancing agents for SME due to their
historical background and their de-
centralized structure. At the same
time they work as intermediary in-
stitutions between the enterprises
and the guarantee banks as well as
the KfW and the DtA.16 They get
                                                  
16 In fact, the share of the large banks, such as
Deutsche and Dresdner, in intermediating
KfW credits for SME decreased from 32 %
(1991) to 15 % (1998) whereas the share of
Sparkassen increased from 20 to 37 % and
support from the guarantee banks,
which are backing credits which the
company’s bank otherwise would not
accept because of the customer’s insuf-
ficient collateral. In the case of SME
programs from KfW and DtA, the com-
pany’s bank transfers the information
and is responsible for the winding-up of
applications. Due to the regional princi-
ple (especially of the Sparkassen) they
invest in other meso-level institutions,
such as technology centers.
• Credit guarantee banks evolved as a
joint private and public risk-partnership.
These banks are present in all the Ger-
man Länder.
• The KfW and the DtA are large gov-
ernment-owned banks with the task of
supporting specific areas of economic
development. Through various pro-
grams in support of SME, they play an
important intermediary role between the
entrepreneurs and commercial banks on
the one hand and the national Mittel-
stand policies on the other.
4.5.1. Public savings banks and credit
cooperatives
There are 600 public savings banks (Sparkas-
sen) with 19,100 branches throughout Ger-
many. They are public-law institutes of the
city or the county in which they are located,
i.e. government representatives play a key role
in governing these institutions, and the gov-
ernment has to bail out Sparkassen which run
into financial difficulties.17 They emerged in
                                                                           
that of credit cooperatives from 10 to 24 %.
Further mergers like the one between the
Dresdner and Deutsche Bank will encourage this
trend in the future.
17  Because the Sparkassen do not receive equity
from the cities or the counties, they have to fi-
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the second half of the 19th century at the
regional level to give the lower classes of
society an opportunity to save money in
interest-bearing accounts as well as to im-
prove the savings ratio and the supply of
credit at the regional and local levels. Un-
til today they have had the duty to offer a
savings account to everyone who wants
one.
At the beginning of the 20th century they
evolved into commercial banks, although
their main business focus is still the col-
lection of the population’s savings (two
thirds of the balance sheet). These savings
finance long-term investments, for exam-
ple in the real estate sector and the local
and regional communities. The activities
and investments of the Sparkassen are –
due to their regional principle – concen-
trated in their local areas. Sparkassen par-
ticipate in the construction and operation
of other institutions or agencies such as
technology centers or regional and local
economic support agencies and offices.
The Sparkassen are, together with the
Volksbanken, the main source of credit for
SME. However, their behavior differs sub-
stantially from county to county, espe-
cially in terms of risk-aversion. They are
the main source of credit both for long-
established SME and for start-ups. But a
common criticism is that they have a
strong preference for financing firms
which have a long track-record, whereas
they tend to rate fast-growing new firms as
too risky. A lending policy which is
sometimes perceived as highly conserva-
tive is the outcome of a governance pat-
tern according to which government repre-
sentatives by all means try to avert finan-
cial problems, since a bail-out would put
                                                                     
nance themselves through savings and the
retention of the profits.
an additional burden on already strained pub-
lic finances.
Apart from the normal business of financing
investment and working capital, Sparkassen
are the main intermediaries for national and
Länder level financing programs targeted to-
wards SME. They implement financing and
guarantee programs for SME which are of-
fered by the KfW and the DtA as well as the
credit guarantee banks (which are mostly op-
erating at the Länder level).
An important element of the Sparkassen sys-
tem are Land level banks (Landesbank-
Girozentrale), which evolved from a mere
intermediary for money transfers to full-
fledged commercial banks which, among
other things, are involved in the global bank-
ing industry. Since they are government-
backed institutions, they enjoy strong credit
ratings and other advantages, something that
private commercial banks perceive as an un-
fair advantage. The Commission of the EU
started to investigate this system in the late
1990s and is expected to enforce certain
changes to create a level playing-field.
The credit cooperatives (Volksbanken and
Raiffeisenkassen18) are involved in the same
tasks as the Sparkassen, and they have addi-
tional responsibilities due to their organization
form as credit cooperatives. They emerged at
the end of the 19th century as private self-help-
institutions of craftsmen, small entrepreneurs
and peasants, who had difficulties in getting
credits from the established banking system.
Since 1974 these banks have also been open
to non-members. They do not have a govern-
ment-backing.
                                                  
18 In the past the Raiffeisenbank concentrated on
agricultural sectors in the countryside, and the
Volksbanken on manufactured sectors in the
cities. In 1972 these two banks merged.
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In 1998 there were 2,248 cooperative
banks with 18,471 branches all over Ger-
many. Although they have a high share in
the overall number of credit institutes, the
share of the cooperatives amounts to only
around 25 % of the total balance sheets in
comparison to the share of the Sparkassen
(around 50 %)coop. But due to several
mergers, their decentralized organization
and close contact to their members the co-
operatives were able to grow and to keep
their competitiveness.
Apart from the organization form and the
historical background, the task of the co-
operatives does not differ to a large extent
from the one of the Sparkassen. Although
the cooperatives are not bound to the lo-
cality principle, their investments are in
fact oriented towards the respective geo-
graphical area.
4.5.2. Credit guarantee banks
Collateral guarantee institutions (Bürg-
schaftsbanken) began operating in the
1950s. It was an initiative of chambers,
savings as well as cooperative banks, and
the Federal Ministry of Economics to im-
plement state-supported financial help for
small-and medium-sized companies. This
joint initiative of public and private actors
emerged from the observation of a lack of
credit due to market failures. After a rather
hesitant beginning, these organizations
developed remarkably. Little by little,
collateral guarantee organizations came
into existence for all branches of business
(wholesale and retail trade, industry, ho-
tels and restaurants, horticulture, self-
employed, etc.). Today, there are credit
guarantee organizations for almost all
branches of business in all Länder. Mean-
while the name "collateral guarantee or-
ganizations" has changed to "guarantee
banks" or "Bürgschaftsbanken".
The 23 Bürgschaftsbanken provide banks with
guarantees for loans, lease-financing contracts
and investments in small and medium-sized
firms, so that the latter are able to hand out
higher credits. The rationale is to facilitate
enterprise financing, thus overcoming the
limits of firms’ own collateral. They support
enterprises in the seed- and start-up phase as
well as projects of existing companies. In ad-
dition to traditional credit and loan financing
– including those from government-supported
programs – Bürgschaftsbanken are also ad-
dressed as "risk partners" in leasing contracts
and providers of equity capital. The scope
ranges from capital investments for the
founding of new enterprises and company ex-
pansion, moving the business to a new loca-
tion, rationalization and measures for adapting
to changing markets on the one hand, and the
whole sphere concerned with working capital,
such as the financing of merchandise, of re-
ceivables, as well as guaranteeing of bonds for
down-payments, warranties etc. on the other
hand.
Founders and shareholders of Bürgschafts-
banken are the chambers of commerce, the
guilds of the different trades, associations of
various business sectors as well as banks and
some insurance companies. They provide the
founding capital, payments into reserve funds,
advice and expertise in the decision-marking
process. No dividends are paid, as surplus
funds are retained and allocated to reserves.
Bürgschaftsbanken operate under the regula-
tions of the German banking law. They are
supervised by the federal supervisory agency
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen) in
much the same way as all other banks in
Germany.
In addition to the support from the founders
and shareholders, the government helps the
Bürgschaftsbanken in three important areas:
1) As non-profit organizations they do not
have to pay corporate income tax, 2) the guar-
antees of the Bürgschaftsbanken are counter-
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guaranteed by the federal and Land gov-
ernment (which back a maximum share of
39 % and 26 %, respectively, of the
amount of the guarantee; in the "new
Länder" this amounts to 48 % from the
federal and 32 % from the Land govern-
ment), 3) long term loans are financed by
the federal government, taken from the so
called ERP fund19 at low interest rates.20
To get a guarantee of a Bürgschaftsbank a
company submits an application form to-
gether with a statement from its bank as-
serting their readiness to take over the
share of the risk the guarantee does not
cover. The share of the Bürgschaftsbank in
the credit risk varies between 50 % and 80
%. The average term of the guarantee is
about 10 years. The upper limit extends to
DM 1.5 million (exceptions are possible).
A flat fee and an annual commission are
charged.
The ultimate criterion for the approval of a
guarantee-application is the financial vi-
ability of the project. The credit-officers
collect and evaluate information such as
balance sheets, business-plans, cash-flow
projections, comments of the chamber of
commerce or the guild, the respective
business association as well as general
data of the specific business sectors, for
example the structure of competition. In
the case of applications of persons plan-
ning to become self-employed, the profes-
sional qualification as well as the knowl-
edge of business and financial affairs are
                                                  
19 A substantial part of the funds which Ger-
many received from the European Recovery
Program, i.e. the Marshall-Fund, after
World-War II, was handed over as a credit
rather than a grant. The repayments of those
funds created the ERP fund, which is a re-
volving fund used for specific purposes such
as SME support. KfW and DtA administrate
the ERP fund.
20 Cf. www.buergschaftsbank.de/outline.htm.
carefully reviewed. A detailed report, pre-
pared by the credit officer, will be discussed
in a committee consisting of representatives
from trade and industry, the banks and repre-
sentatives from the Ministries for Economics
and Finance. The ultimate decision lies with
the management of the Bürgschaftsbanken
although the concurrence of the committee is
necessary.
4.5.3. The Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the
Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA)
The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
was established in 1948 by law as a public
corporation for special functions. KfW is the
German economic development bank. Its
main business takes place inside Germany.
However, it is also the executing agency for
financial assistance to developing countries.
80 % of its capital of DM 1 billion is held by
the federal government, 20 % by the Länder.
With a balance sheet total of around DM 250
billion it counts among the biggest banks in
Germany. In the first years after World War
II, KfW financed the reconstruction of Ger-
many with long-term credits. Later it focused
more and more on the support of structural
adjustment within the German economy. To-
day its task is in investment finance, export
and project finance, financial cooperation and
advisory as well as other services. KfW can
be seen, together with the Deutsche Aus-
gleichsbank, as one of the most important in-
stitutions of the national Mittelstand policy,
since they administrate the government’s fi-
nancial support programs for SME and large
enterprises. KfW is engaged in programs for
investments, environmental technology and
foreign investments, venture capital and infra-
structure.
The Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA) is a
wholly-owned development agency of the
German federal government. The agency,
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which was established in 1950, was ini-
tially set up to help compensate for the fi-
nancial burdens and to aid the integration
of expelled persons and refugees into West
Germany after World War II. Over time its
function changed to a special purpose
agency which provides subsidized loans,
equity financing and guarantees on behalf
of the federal government in order to pro-
mote SME. This now constitutes the
Bank’s main area of business. Due to the
programs of the national Mittelstand poli-
cies the DtA does not only support busi-
ness start-ups. It also supports environ-
mental protection projects, educational
and social programs as well as mobilizing
venture capital for young high-tech and
low-tech companies through its wholly-
owned subsidiaries, the Technologie-
Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft and Beteili-
gungs-Gesellschaft. DtA, like the KfW,
funds SME in Germany from two sources
– from Germany’s European Recovery
Program (ERP) fund and its own funds
which it raises on the domestic and inter-
national markets. DtA is the main lending
bank for loans from the ERP fund.21
4.6 Chambers of industry and
commerce and of crafts
Germany has 82 regional chambers of in-
dustry and commerce and 55 chambers of
crafts. They cover the entire territory of
Germany. They are public-law institutions
administrated by the private sector. Mem-
bership is compulsory. Due to their long
tradition (since the second half of the last
century) and early political incorporation
in German history they are in charge of
many public supervision tasks, especially
in terms of registering companies, certi-
                                                  
21 Cf. www.dta.de.
fying vocational training and taking exams.
They issue certificates of origin.
Moreover, they offer their members a range of
courses in ongoing education (management,
production, investment-, business and finan-
cial planning), information and advice in ex-
port, start-up, technology transfer and legal
issues.22 They organize events to stimulate
enterprise cooperation and joint ventures,
start-ups, and technology updating within the
region and worldwide, and they are responsi-
ble for giving advice on guarantees
(Bürgschaften) to the corresponding banks at
the regional and federal levels. They also ad-
vise the local and regional government on
questions which concern their members and
the local, regional, and federal economy. They
are also well informed of existing support in-
struments for SME and large enterprises.
Chambers sometimes take a share in technol-
ogy centers and incubators or local and re-
gional economic support agencies. Coopera-
tion with other institutions like training and
advisory organizations leads to the construc-
tion of "Houses of Crafts" or "Economic Sup-
port Centers" in many larger cities.
Regarding chambers of crafts, it is important
to note that even though their history goes
back to the medieval guilds, they exist de-
spite, not because of this tradition. In fact,
they were bound for abolition in the 19th cen-
tury since they appeared as an obstacle to in-
dustrial dynamism. It was only after pro-
tracted lobbying and negotiation processes
that their existence was confirmed, and this
was pretty much due to a functional argument,
especially in terms of guaranteeing a consis-
tent quality of vocational training.
                                                  
22 The chambers of commerce and trade have got
110 offices in 70 nations throughout the world to
encourage foreign economy relations. Look at
Internet: www.ahk.de
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4.7 Economic promotion agencies at
the local, regional and Länder
levels
In the past, economic support at the Land
level was organized by the Ministries of
Economics. At the local level, local ad-
ministration is responsible for economic
promotion, which traditionally meant, first
and foremost, provision of real estate. The
last decade has seen both the amplification
of local activities and the creation of re-
gional economic promotion agencies at the
level in-between, founded by the different
local authorities, private institutions and
enterprises in the region. With the change
of framework conditions the organiza-
tional forms of these institutions also
changed. Reforms were necessary within
the different units. They contributed to
new organizational forms and responsi-
bilities.
In the 1980s local economic promotion
was organized as a department within lo-
cal administration. Subsequently, local
governments have tried to adapt their or-
ganization and working methods to the
changing circumstances. To be more
flexible and transparent, a great deal of re-
sponsibilities of state Ministries of Eco-
nomics was transferred to economic sup-
port agencies. The same occurred at the
local level. Here, the model of public-
private partnership (PPP) gained impor-
tance. The advantage of this form of or-
ganization is a less bureaucratic and more
efficient style with synergy effects due to
the closer cooperation with the private
sector.
There are different forms of PPP. Often
organized as a limited liability company
(GmbH), the public sector generally holds
a majority, with the chambers or the pri-
vate sector (banks, employers’ associa-
tions, estate and assurance companies, pri-
vate enterprises) holding minority shares. At
the same time, the focus of most of the local
promotion agencies extended from the provi-
sion of real estate and enterprise zones to-
wards marketing of the location, SME and
entrepreneurship support, business networking
initiatives, and further activities.
Economic promotion agencies at the Land
level, which sometimes take the form of PPPs,
coordinate the support at the different levels.
In the past they encouraged the renovation
and redevelopment of cities and old industrial
infrastructure. Today they also encourage the
construction of European and international
cooperation networks of SME. They also or-
ganize information dissemination towards the
lower levels regarding support programs from
the Land and the European Union. Other ac-
tivities include locational marketing to attract
investors and export promotion.
The aim of regional support agencies is re-
gional location consultancy and marketing.
These institutions develop regional develop-
ment concepts, and they start to explore the
possibilities of the creation, fostering and
management of clusters. They often also or-
ganize meetings of SME in the region and co-
operation projects with large enterprises.
5 Sources of support for the
Mittelstand at the European,
national and regional levels
5.1 The role of the state in SME
support policies
In the course of the last forty years, different
SME support policies were introduced in
Germany to alleviate the weaknesses and the
market failures which impede the access of
SME to credit, venture capital and R&D, as
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well as deficiencies regarding information
and consulting, cooperation, export orien-
tation and start-ups. Whereas the last
chapter focused on the description of sev-
eral public and private institutions and
public-private partnerships, we will now
look at the evolution of European, na-
tional, regional, and local support policies
as well as the specific instruments.
The ascendance of support policies, pro-
grams and instruments reflects an in-
creasing consideration of SME develop-
ment in German economic policy. At the
end of the last century, the government of
the Reich as well as small entrepreneurs
created some fundamentals for the later
success of SME, like measures for sup-
porting handicraft as well as the introduc-
tion of the dual training system. Never-
theless, during this period industrial policy
focused at large enterprises and heavy in-
dustries. It was only in the -period after
World War II, and especially in the 1960s,
that SME support policies received rising
consideration. Ever since SME support
policies have evolved step by step, with
the importance of SME and also the num-
ber of support programs increasing in par-
allel to the process of structural change
(read: the decline of traditional industrial
sectors and the massive loss of jobs).
In the 1950s and 1960s SME support was
justified by their important role regarding
the vitalization of competition in the econ-
omy, as well as their suffering from cer-
tain market failures. In the 1970s and
1980s, more emphasis was given to the
potential contribution of SME to employ-
ment creation and innovation. During
these two decades rationalization and relo-
cation processes of large enterprises, in-
cluding relocation of traditional industries
to low-wage countries, started to have a
notable impact on unemployment. At the
same time, SME in countries like USA
and Japan demonstrated their innovative po-
tential in the world market. SME support
measures were amplified and diversified in
order to sustain the international competitive-
ness of the German economy. For instance, it
is not by chance that technology incubators
became popular as a tool to encourage tech-
nology-based start-ups. In the 1980s and
1990s, many hopes were pinned on the crea-
tion of innovative small firms and their con-
tribution to the creation of well-paid, secure
jobs. Creating new jobs, and actually jobs at
different qualification levels, became an ever
more pressing necessity since traditional in-
dustries like coal and steel continued to de-
cline, relocation of industry to low-wage
countries went on, and competitive pressure
kept rising, not the least due to a demand
which was increasingly differentiated and
price-conscious, while at the same time ex-
pecting high quality.
5.2 SME support in regional and
structural policies at the European
Union and the federal/land levels
5.2.1. EU regional and SME policy
The main objective of the EU Commission’s
initiatives is the deepening of the European
integration process in economic, political and
social terms. Based on the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the European Union supports, first,
backward regions and regions which suffer
from structural crises, mainly due to the de-
cline of traditional industries, and, second,
branches and certain disadvantaged groups
within each member state, independent of
their location. Regarding SME support, EU
policies can be distinguished along these
lines. The first line of action includes regional
policy measures, which often give an indirect
support to SME. The second line includes di-
rect support policies for SME, especially in
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terms of technological upgrading. In both
cases the EU provides the financial re-
sources and defines the framework condi-
tions. The policies are carried out in the
context of special support programs,
which are formulated together with the
member states, the regional and local gov-
ernments and non-government economic
and social actors. The member states have
to define a development plan, which has to
be presented to the Commission for ex-
amination and approval. The programs
contained in the development plan have to
define the goals, criteria, and target groups
of implementation activities pursued by
public and private actors at a decentralized
level.
For the implementation of regional policy
the European Commission has established
structural funds for different support areas.
Regarding SME support, the most impor-
tant funds are the European Fund for Re-
gional Development (EFRE) and the
European Social Fund (ESF). EFRE ad-
dresses regions with severe economic and
social problems. Until recently, the Com-
mission defined six types of regions to be
supported, according to different types of
structural problems. From the year 2000
onwards it will distinguish only between
three types of regions, after having re-
structured the rules of regional policy,
trying to focus at the most backward re-
gions.23 In West Germany, especially old
industrial regions have been supported
("target 2"). Since reunification the entire
former GDR has also received support
since per-capita GDP was substantially
                                                  
23 Until recently the EU distinguished between
regions which are backward in their devel-
opment stage (target 1), are confronted with
declining industrial development (2), experi-
ence high unemployment (3), experience a
structural adjustment process in the agricul-
tural and fishing sector as well as in the rural
areas (4, 5, 6).
lower than the EU average ("target 1").24
EFRE focuses on the creation and preserva-
tion of employment, the restructuring and de-
velopment of old and new industrial areas as
well as on other projects for regional devel-
opment; SME support comes in to the extent
that it contributes to these goals.25 The ESF
addresses areas like training, qualification,
further education, support of personnel in sci-
ence and technology as well as interaction
between training institutions and the eco-
nomic sector.
More direct support policies for SME, inde-
pendent of region and location, have gained
importance in the last decade. Various pro-
grams and institutions have been established
to stimulate and support SME and other eco-
nomic and social actors. Particularly impor-
tant are the EU Framework Program for the
Support of Science and Technology (FTE),
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Investment  Fund (EIF).26 These in-
stitutions spend part of their resources to pro-
vide risk capital and to support start-ups of in-
novative firms, R&D, qualification and fur-
ther education, international cooperation be-
tween firms, loans, venture capital funds, and
credit guarantees.27
                                                  
24 From 1994 to 1999 the new federal states re-
ceived 13.64 billion euro through the EU funds,
the old industrial areas in the west 733 million
euro. For measures against unemployment Ger-
many received 1.94 billion euro until 1999
(Geilen & Vielhaber 1999: 7).
25 For information about the EFRE and ESF see
www.inforegio.org.
26 A minimum of 10 % of all financial resources
from the FTE has to be spend on SME. In the
years from 1999 to 2002 these are 1.5 billion
euro (Geilen & Vielhaber 1999: 12).
27 Regarding the support for SME in the EU see
www.cordis.lu .
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5.2.2. Regional and SME policy at
the national and regional
levels
SME support at the national and regional
levels distinguishes between regional pol-
icy and the Mittelstand and technology
policies at the national and Länder levels.
Regional policy is defined in the German
Constitution as a joint task of the federal
government and the Länder, and its strat-
egy and instrument are defined in the
framework of the so-called Joint Task to
Improve the Regional Economic Structure
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe, GA). GA was
formulated in 1969 and its main objective
is the reduction of disparities between
German regions. Federal and Länder gov-
ernments each contribute 50 % of the
funding, whereas it is the task of the
Länder and the municipal governments to
actually implement the policy.28
Like the regional policy of the EU, the Ger-
man regional policy addresses regions
with severe economic and social problems.
GA distinguishes three types of backward
regions:
• A: the weakest East German re-
gions;
• B: the other East German regions;
• C: backward areas and areas suffer-
ing from structural problems in
West Germany.
GA uses as main instruments grants for
firms which will invest in modernization
or in the expansion of their productive ca-
pacity, thus securing jobs or creating new
employment. SME receive preferential
treatment. The maximum grant element
                                                  
28 In the 1999 budget the federal government
and the Länder each spent 235 million DM
on the GA (Deutscher Bundestag 1999: 15).
differs according to the type of region where
the respective facility is located: 50 % in the
case of SME and 35 % for large firms in A
regions, 43 % / 28 % in B regions and 28 % /
18 % in C regions (Deutscher Bundestag
1999: 13). GA funds may also be used to sub-
sidize consultancy, to finance training and re-
search activities of enterprises and for credit
guarantees.
Apart from GA, there are specific programs
addressing SME. Some of them are labeled
Joint Initiatives (Gemeinschaftsinitiativen)
between the EU and the federal government.
One of them is the ‘Initiative for the adapta-
tion of SME in the European market’, which
supports the introduction of systems of quality
and environmental management (Eco-Audit).
It offers subsidies with a maximum share of
80 % of total cost and a maximum amount of
DM 60,000.
Other special Mittelstand policies are carried
out at the different levels. An explicit Mittel-
stand policy at the federal level was intro-
duced in 1970 in order to create adequate
framework conditions for SME and to allevi-
ate market failures. In 1996 the federal budget
for Mittelstand policies amounted to DM 3.5
billion.29 On top of that there are financial re-
sources from the ERP fund (1995: DM 13.6
billion), which is administrated by the Federal
Ministry of Economics and passed on via the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and
the Deutsche Ausgleichbank (DtA).
                                                  
29 This sum does not include the institutional sup-
port for chambers, associations and other institu-
tions mentioned before.
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The Mittelstand policies of the Länder
emerged in the middle of the 1970s as a
response to accelerating structural change.
Today, there are more than 100 support
programs and instruments as well as more
than 1,000 economic support organiza-
tions, which are public, private or PPP.
There are two points of view which both,
to a certain extent, justify this diversity.
The first is to emphasize the high degree
of decentralization, which allows institu-
tions to tailor their activities to the local
profile and the specific local problems and
opportunities. Also, both collaboration and
competition exist, thus creating synergies
and at the same time a healthy rivalry
which encourages creativity. The other
point is to criticize overlaps and lack of
coordination, lack of transparency and
substantial transaction and opportunity
costs. Moreover, the monitoring and
evaluating systems are very deficient. The
only major evaluation of the support sys-
tem was commissioned by the federal
government in 1997.
5.3 Specific support programs and
instruments
5.3.1. The support of start-ups
Apart from technology and incubator centers
as well as information centers at the local
level there are several programs at the na-
tional and Länder levels to facilitate the fi-
nancing of new enterprises, namely the ERP
equity support program (EKH), the ERP start-
up program, the DtA start-up program and the
DtA Startgeld. These programs are accessible
to new entrepreneurs all over Germany. They
are designed to support the start-up phase of a
new enterprise, to finance investments in ma-
terials, machines, premises, etc., and to im-
prove the equity base. It is possible to com-
bine support from different programs.
The EKH (equity program) is particularly
relevant for entrepreneurs with little savings
and guarantees. To get loans from the EKH
the founder does not need collateral. Provided
that his personal equity amounts to at least 15
% of the necessary capital, he can receive
further 25 % of the necessary capital through
Table 7: Start-up programs
Support program    Territory 1 Area Size of Enterprise Sector
ERP equity support
(EKH) ALL
Increase founder’s
equity
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
ERP start-up ALL Investments in the
start-up phase
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
DtA start-up ALL Investments,
qualification, con-
sultancy, equip-
ment
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
DtA Startgeld ALL Investments in the
start-up phase
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL=the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
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EKH. The DtA and ERP start-up programs
together make it possible to cover 75 % of
the expenses of a start-up with loans (in
the new Länder even more). But there are
still possibilities to bridge the financial
gap (in this case of 10 %). One possibility
is a commercial bank offering a credit at
market conditions. Another option is the
DtA start-up program, which can give ad-
ditional loans if a start-up creates jobs
(DM 50,000 for each job).
The DtA Startgeld program is another op-
tion. It addresses founders with no equity
at all. Lack of collateral is no obstacle, ei-
ther, for a loan up to DM 100,000. This
gives financially weak founders (like young
persons or unemployed) a chance of access to
long-term loans. There is another support pro-
gram for the support of technology-oriented
start-ups (FUTOUR). The subsidy may cover
up to 70 % of overall investment.
Apart from the national programs, the Länder
have created additional programs. We will
take the activities in North-Rhine Westphalia
(NRW) as an example of such initiatives. Two
programs in NRW are particularly interesting.
First, there is the " Impulses for the Economy
Program." One element of the program is the
support of start-ups. It is designed as a joint
activity of the investment bank NRW (a Land
Table 8: Investment support programs
Support program Territory 1 Area Size of enterprise Sector
Special investment
support program
NFS Investments
All
Small and medium-sized
enterprises of all sectors
Special deprecia-
tion
ALL Tax relief for in-
vestments in ma-
chines and build-
ings
SME Small and medium-sized
enterprises of all sectors
ERP regional pro-
gram
OFS Investment support
within the regions
of the Gemein-
schaftsaufgabe
SME Handicraft, trade,  manu-
facturing industry, tourism,
transport industry, free-lance
sector
ERP construction
program
NFS Construction in-
vestments
SME
"
KfW Mittelstand
program
ALL Construction and
equipment invest-
ments
ALL
"
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL=the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
Table 9: Research cooperation, technology innovation and transfer programs
Support-program Territory 1 Area Size of enterprise Sector
R&D and innovation NFS Personnel and proj-
ect support in re-
search
SME Handicraft, trade, manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
R&D alliances ALL Cooperative re-
search between
SME
SME Handicraft, trade, manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
PRO INNO
ALL Joint R&D projects
between SME and
institutes
SME Handicraft, trade, manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
Patent action ALL Support to research
and application for
a patent
SME Handicraft, trade, manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL=the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
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level, government-owned development
bank) and the DtA. They support the fi-
nancing of investments and means of pro-
duction for founders. It is comparable to
the DtA start-up program. But there are
important differences. While the DtA
start-up program supports only founders
before they start their business, the joint
program may support new firms until the
eighth year of their existence. Moreover, it
offers loans of up to 100 % for additional
costs of means of production, and there are
loans with lower interest rates for special
target groups.
Second, there is the "GO! initiative"
(Gründungsoffensive), which was
launched in 1995 as a joint initiative of the
Land government, chambers, economic
support agencies, credit institutes, em-
ployers’ and employees’ associations,
technology centers and universities at the
local and regional levels. Private and pub-
lic actors support start-ups in a network
pattern, each organization within its spe-
cific area of competence, with some or-
ganizations acting as network managers,
advising potential entrepreneurs on where
they can obtain what kind of information
and support. Overall, there are 30 regional
and local start-up networks to provide in-
formation and advice free of charge. The
economic promotion agency of NRW es-
tablished a toll-free phone number where
potential entrepreneurs receive informa-
tion on network members in their respec-
tive region. As it involved an intensive
marketing strategy, the term
‘GO Initiative’ is today a synonym for
start-up in NRW.
The main objective, not only of the
GO Initiative, is to change the traditional
mentality and encourage a new culture of
entrepreneurship. Awareness-building and
specific training activities in universities
are additional instruments.  The number of
start-up information events increased from 27
in the first half of 1996 to 130 in the second
half of 1998. Business-plan contests are or-
ganized, and the Land government supports
junior researchers who are prepared to set up
their own firms inside university.
5.3.2. Investment support
Investment grants are the main instrument of
the Joint Task (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe).
Moreover, there are the ERP regional and
KfW Mittelstand programs, and there are also
indirect support measures for investments like
tax relief. Marginal tax rates on profits in
Germany are comparatively high (up to 53 %)
and large firms have much more latitude to
use loopholes within that system than SME.
Support measures are supposed to compensate
for these distortions.
Credit guarantees are another important in-
strument to support productive investments.
As we have explained above, specialized
guarantee banks offer them to all sorts of
firms, although they are particularly relevant
to small businesses.
5.3.3. Research cooperation,
technology innovation and
transfer
There are several programs at the national and
Länder levels to support research and tech-
nology transfer inside and among SME and
between SME and research institutes. Some of
the programs are supported by subsidies, spe-
cial credit lines and by venture capital pro-
grams.
At the national level there are especially four
subsidy programs worth mentioning. These
are
• Support for research, development and
innovation in SME and external re-
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search institutes, restricted to the
new Länder in the East. This pro-
gram focuses on personnel and proj-
ect support. The personnel support
is based on subsidies of 40 % for re-
search personnel working in SME to
improve product and process inno-
vation. SME obtain a grant of up to
45 % of the project total for the de-
velopment of new concepts and
products.
• Support of Joint Industrial Research,
a program which subsidizes research
projects focused on cooperation
between SME of one branch or
technological area.
• Program for Innovation Competence
in Mittelstand enterprises (PRO
INNO), subsidizing joint R&D proj-
ects of SME and research institutes.
• SME patent action, supporting SME
with little experience in patent ap-
plications.
Apart from subsidies there is the option of
receiving long-term credits at favorable
interest rates from the ERP innovation
program. It applies to all activities gener-
ating product and process innovation. In
the R&D phase it may be used to finance
personnel, inputs and other investment. At
the launch of the product consultancy,
market research and further qualification
of personnel may be financed through this
program.
At the Länder level there are several tech-
nology and research cooperation pro-
grams. For instance, NRW has the "Tech-
nology Program for the Economy", which
supports SME and technology-oriented
start-ups through subsidies from the In-
vestment Bank NRW, funding between 25
and 40 % of services and technology-
related capital goods.
Contests are another interesting incentive for
innovation like the Mittelstand award, the In-
noRegio contest, the BioRegio and EXIST
contest. They are launched by the Federal
Ministry of Economics and the Federal Min-
istry of Education and Research, respectively.
The Mittelstand award is given to SME with
outstanding product innovation. The InnoRe-
gio contest is confined to the new Länder. Its
main objective is the sustainable improvement
of the employment situation and the strength-
ening of the competitive potential at the re-
gional level. In order to achieve this objective,
concepts and projects are to be developed at
the regional level, aiming at the utilization of
innovation potentials. The establishment of
regional networks is also supposed to be fos-
tered, where people from different fields of
activity engage in joint innovation and learn-
ing projects (especially involving research in-
stitutions and enterprises). They are expected
to develop ideas and visions in new coopera-
tion patterns beyond administrative borders or
department barriers. A limited number of re-
gions, with particularly promising proposals,
will then receive grant funding.
Another strategy is pursued by the BioRegio
and the EXIST contest. Both are mainly di-
rected at improving the technological and
economical competitive advantage of Ger-
many. In the case of BioRegio, scientific ex-
cellence in biotechnology research is brought
together with industrial needs and interests, so
that not only the share of new products
reaching the market stage will increase, but
new firms for biotechnological product and
process development will also emerge.
EXIST, on the other hand, aims at improving
the entrepreneurial climate in Germany in
general and at universities, polytechnics and
research institutes in particular by transferring
good practices in support for new businesses,
developed in regional networks, to other re-
gions and by stimulating similar activities at
other locations (Koschatzky 1999: 12).
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5.3.4. Environmental programs
Numerous programs have been launched
in Germany to encourage energy effi-
ciency, the use of renewable energies, and
recycling of materials. Energy saving and
environmental programs receive support
from the ERP, DtA and KfW funds. They
offer long-term credits at favorable inter-
est rates. They cater both to SME and
large enterprises. The ERP and DtA envi-
ronment programs supplement each other,
while the KfW environment program can
also be supplemented by the KfW Mittel-
stand program due the investment orienta-
tion of the latter.
Special programs support energy effi-
ciency measures and renewable energy.
The KfW CO2-reduction program offers
loans for energy efficiency investments of
enterprises and private households. These
loans can cover as much as the total sum of a
given investment. The "Program for the Sup-
port of Renewable Energies," supported by
the Federal Economics Office (Bundesamt für
Wirtschaft), hands out subsidies for invest-
ments in solar collectors, water power plants,
and others.
At the Länder level there are several programs
to support the same areas and also special re-
search projects which work in that area.
5.3.5. Venture and seed capital
The German business investment or venture
capital market came into being in the 1960s
when, against the background of increasing
discussion on the lack of equity and the falling
ratio of equity to total assets of small and me-
Table 10: Environmental programs
Support-program Territory 1 Area Size of enterprise Sector
ERP Environmental
Program
ALL Investments in en-
ergy efficiency
measures, recycling
etc.
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
DtA Environmental
Program
ALL Investments in en-
ergy efficiency
measures, recycling
etc
SME Handicraft, trade, manufacturing
industry, tourism, transport in-
dustry, free-lance sector
KfW CO2 -reduc-
tion
ALL CO2 –reduction ALL ALL
Support of renew-
able energies
ALL Investments in re-
newable energy
ALL ALL
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL= the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
Table 11: Venture and seed capital
Support program Territory 1 Area Size of
enterprise
Sector
ERP equity pro-
gram
ALL Refinancing of equity
participation
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry
KfW risk capital
program
ALL Safeguarding from eq-
uity participation
SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry
BTU ALL Equity Capital, R&D,
Investments
SMALL Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL= the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
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dium industry, banks set up the first busi-
ness investment companies. These had the
aim of making equity or equity-type
funding available to SME which were not
quotable at the stock exchange.
A second phase of the German venture
capital market began in the early 1970s.
Since 1970, the Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics, as administrator of the ERP Spe-
cial Fund and other funds from KfW and
DtA, has offered low-interest re-financing
and guarantees for small and medium-
sized firms. The intention was to stimulate
the creation of business investment com-
panies with an element of (regional) eco-
nomic promotion, thus helping to secure
existing SME in their region. However,
private companies were making less use
than had been expected of the ERP special
fund offers. Thus, the Länder created
Mittelstand equity share corporations
(‘Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesell-
schaften’, MBGs), which commenced
their business activities in the 1970s and
the 1980s in all Länder. However, at that
time – due to the ERP guidelines – the
MBGs did not invest in new technology-
based firms either, so that there was no
supply of investment capital for this kind
of firms. In particular, there was a lack of
venture capital which was oriented to-
wards long-term application and therefore
did not put a strain on the liquidity of a
new enterprise during the first years of its
development.
The German business investment capital
market entered its third phase in the early
1980s. This was preceded by information
and discussions on the successful Ameri-
can venture capital model, in which equity
plus management support were offered to
new technology-based enterprises with a
strong growth potential. A comparatively
rapid development of the German venture
capital market began. From 1983 to 1995
the volume of the market increased by seven
times. The growth rates have been particularly
high in the 1990s.
In the last years the German venture capital
market entered another phase. A significant
role was played by the pilot scheme "Business
investment capital for new technology-based
firms" (BJTU), which created favorable con-
ditions for the founding of several seed capital
companies and has also contributed to encour-
aging a number of existing business invest-
ment and venture capital companies to par-
ticipate once more in the early development
phases of new technology-based firms. A
further important innovation was, in 1997, the
creation of the "New Market", modeled after
NASDAQ, as part of the Frankfurt stock ex-
change. By the end of 1999, more than 200
initial public offerings had taken place.
In Germany, the private and public banks in
particular act as investors, providing consid-
erably over half the volume of funding sup-
plied by all business investment capital com-
panies. In the new Länder the venture capital
market is just in the process of formation, so
that it is not yet possible to evaluate who the
main investors are (Wupperfeld 1997: 149ff.).
5.3.6. Export and foreign economic
relation support
The support of export activities for SME is
ranging from information provision over sup-
port of participation in national and interna-
tional fairs to export and investment credits as
well as insurance programs and guarantees for
investments in foreign countries.
Regarding participation in fairs, SME from
East Germany are able to get support for na-
tional events, while support for participation
in international fairs is available for all enter-
prises. The support consists mainly in cover-
ing a part of the fees for the stand at the fair.
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An additional special offer for East Ger-
man SME is the program for marketing,
which is supposed to help them to define
strategies and to sell their products on the
European market.
Other institutions like the chambers of
trade in other countries (Auslandshandel-
skammern) and the Federal Agency for
Foreign Trade Information (Bundesstelle
für Außenhandelsinformationen, bfai) pro-
vide specialized information about foreign
markets. The Hermes export credit insur-
ance is available for every enterprise. The
ERP export financing program supports
both German exporters and importers. To
receive a credit from the ERP fund, an ex-
port has to be insured through Hermes.
There are two programs to support foreign
investment. The guarantee for capital in-
vestments in foreign countries offers in-
surance for investments abroad, like Ger-
man enterprises’ share in foreign enter-
prises or wholly-owned subsidiaries. An-
other program is the KfW Mittelstand pro-
gram (foreign countries). It provides SME
with funds to finance all kinds of invest-
ments abroad (including acquisitions of
other enterprises) based on a long-term credit.
The KfW program and the guarantee for
capital investment complement each other,
just like the Hermes insurance and the ERP
program.
There are several Länder programs to promote
export and investments abroad. For instance,
the NRW program ‘Impulses for the Econ-
omy’ gives special emphasis to SME and for-
eign markets. The program supports partici-
pation of SME in fairs and foreign economic
consultancy through the German chambers of
commerce abroad.
The chambers of industry and commerce and
their national umbrella organization (DIHT)
have launched the company pool program.
The idea is to reduce the barriers SME face
when they try to enter overseas markets, espe-
cially in developing countries. Between 12
and 20 companies, mostly from different
branches, form a pool to cover the costs of
one joint representative who acts as a kind of
local representative of all the pool firms in
one host country. About 60 pools are operat-
ing.
Table 12: Export and foreign economic relation support
Support program Territory 1 Area Size of
enterprise
Sector
National fair support NFS Participation in fairs SME Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry, free-
lance sector
Foreign fair support ALL Participation in fairs ALL Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry, free-
lance sector, private persons
Hermes export credit
insurance
ALL Risk reduction of ex-
ports
ALL German Credit institutes and exporters
ERP export financing ALL Export credits ALL Industry
Guarantee for invest-
ments in foreign
countries
ALL German investments
abroad
ALL Enterprises located in Germany
KfW Mittelstand-
Program (abroad)
ALL Foreign investments,
research and innovation
ALL Handicraft, trade,  manufacturing in-
dustry, tourism, transport industry, free-
lance sector
1NFS= New Länder, OFS= Old Länder, ALL= the whole of Germany (BMWi 1999)
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5.3.7. Inter-firm cooperation
There are several programs which try to
encourage horizontal and vertical inter-
firm cooperation. One of them has been
mentioned above: PRO INNO. It supports
research projects of a group of SME of
one branch. Moreover, the EU supports,
with the ‘Joined European Venture Pro-
gram’, the creation of transnational joint
ventures between SME of different mem-
ber states.
At the local level, many chambers have set
up matching systems where SME can pre-
sent themselves as potential cooperation
partners or obtain information about other
firms. Another initiative tries to encourage
the cooperation between founders and ex-
perienced business leaders, for instance
the Business Angel concept, based on ex-
perience in the U.S. The "Angel" does not
only offer his know-how but also has a
stake in the start-up. With the financial as-
sistance of the KfW, the initiative for
Business Angels has started a virtual fo-
rum in the Internet.
Other cooperation initiatives can be found
in every Land. For instance, a construction
handicraft network for cooperation was
founded with financial resources of the
NRW government; construction enter-
prises with complementary specialization
profiles combine their offers, rethinking
their working methods and adapting their
strategies to increase their competitive-
ness. There are also many initiatives, or-
ganized by the chambers or the regional
economic support agencies, where new
entrepreneurs and more experienced ones
meet to exchange experience.
There are also several programs address-
ing business-owners who are looking for
successors. It has been estimated that
about 300,000 SME with four million em-
ployees are potential candidates for such pro-
grams. The chambers and the Federal Minis-
try of Family, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ)
have started an initiative to support matching
between aging business-owners and potential
successors, i.e. professionals who would pre-
fer to take over an existing business rather
than start a new one. A similar activity is part
of the GO Initiative in NRW. The Initiative
introduced a pilot project in the Ruhr Valley,
the traditional industrial region of NRW. The
chambers, regional economic promotion of-
fices, and business associations are involved
in this project.
6 Justification and significance of
SME support policies in
Germany
It is by no means self-evident that a country’s
government pursues a SME support policy.
Many industrialized and developing countries
have actually pursued large enterprise support
policies in the past. The results have been
mixed at best, and that was one of the reasons
why meso-level policies, i.e. the whole set of
specific policies to shape the business envi-
ronment, came under criticism. All too often,
this kind of policy leads to corporate welfare,
pork-barreling, clientelism, corruption, a sub-
sidy mentality, and other effects which ham-
per economic growth.
In such a perspective, it is notable that there is
little debate on the general principles of SME
support policies in Germany, even more so
since "Ordnungspolitik", i.e. the economic
sub-discipline which deals with the basic or-
ganization of economies and defines the fea-
tures of a functioning market economy, is one
of the few genuine contributions German
economists made to the discipline in the 20th
century. It seems that there is a kind of basic
consensus regarding the necessity of SME
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support. This is most likely based on three
considerations.
First, there is the constitution, which es-
tablishes that Germany is a social market
economy rather than a free market econ-
omy. Accordingly, there is widespread
agreement that the government has to play
an active role in the economy. Moreover,
the constitution stipulates that the gov-
ernment has to take care to alleviate eco-
nomic and social gaps between regions,
thus establishing a regional policy  which
to some extent overlaps with SME support
policies.
Second, there is the economic justifica-
tion, which is largely based on market
failure arguments and observations de-
rived from institutional economics, such as
bounded rationality and transaction costs.
Certain market failures, such as under-
investment in R&D, affect all companies,
independent of size. Additionally, SME
suffer from specific market failures, such
as barriers to entry and access to finance,
and transaction costs, for instance in terms
of access to foreign markets.
Third, there is the political and political
economy argument. The SME segment is
reasonably well organized – via chambers
and their umbrella organizations, via dedi-
cated sectoral associations, and via the
Mittelstand caucus in the conservative
party. Owners of small businesses are an
important segment of the electorate.
Moreover, coming to the political econ-
omy argument, it is hard to conceive why
there should be no SME support in a func-
tioning democracy – SME create jobs, job
creation is a major issue for politicians,
and therefore it is politically wise to come
up with support measures. This is even
more so in declining and structurally weak
regions, where SME support is an impor-
tant element of a whole set of emergency
policy measures.
Yet, one may argue that a substantial gap ex-
ists between the expectations attached to SME
support, and the degree of attention SME sup-
port receives in both the political and aca-
demic discussion, and its real impact. Since
the wave of constant monitoring and evalua-
tion, which is a prominent feature of Anglo-
Saxon countries, has not yet swept over Ger-
many, there is only a limited amount of im-
pact assessments available so far. They show
the following:
• Within the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe
(which addresses not only SME), in the
period 1996 – 1998 grants for firms in
the old Länder amounted to DM 1,460
million, leveraging an overall invest-
ment of DM 12,687 million. Thus,
27,186 new jobs were created, and
88,795 existing jobs were secured (i.e.
they might have vanished otherwise). In
the new Länder, grants amounted to
DM 17,009 million, and investment to
57,665 million, creating 107,546 new
jobs and securing 330,096 jobs. An
evaluation of the program, which in-
vestigated the period 1980 – 1989,
found that on average 43,000 jobs were
created annually, with each DM 1 mil-
lion stimulating the creation of 39 new
jobs. It also found that the overall goal,
namely the reduction of regional dis-
parities, was missed (Deutscher Bunde-
stag 1999: 20).
• An evaluation of EU-financed regional
policy activities (EFRE) in the Land of
North Rhine-Westphalia, where stimu-
lating private investment is one of the
main activities,30 especially targeting
                                                  
30 It is, however, important to note that the bulk of
funds went into infrastructure investment and re-
cycling of real estate (i.e. cleaning the ecological
burden from earlier phases of industrialization).
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SME, found that, in the period 1994
– 1996, 1,047 grants to firms in-
volved DM 181 million, leveraging
private investment of DM 1,027
million and creating 3,222 new jobs.
• In 1996, an investigation of technol-
ogy centers and incubators in both
old and new Länder made the fol-
lowing observations (Sternberg et al.
1996: 190 ff). Their main effect is to
support new firms in the first phase
of expansion; in terms of inducing
start-ups, the effects are negligible.
The job creation effects are very
limited, albeit it is important to note
that the quality of jobs created in
centers is very high. Technology
transfer to firms outside the centers
is very limited, and the synergy
between firms inside the centers un-
satisfactory. Apparently the poten-
tial of high-technology start-ups in
Germany is limited and does not
match the space available in centers,
so that center managers lower entry
barriers.
• In 1997, an evaluation of technology
centers and incubators in the Land
North Rhine-Westphalia (where
about a third of such centers in
Germany has been founded) came to
the following conclusions (Elle et al.
1997: 3 ff). The Land government
had spent DM 1.05 billion from
1984 to 1996 to found 52 centers,
thus creating 330,000 square meters
of high-quality business space. 55 %
                                                                     
In the period 1989 – 1996, investment grants
amounted to DM 131 million, i.e. 6.7 % of
the total, whereas one third of the funds were
spent on recycling of real estate. Another
third of the funds went into the creation of
technology centers and incubators (TGZ)
and training facilities (InWIS, MR & NEI
1997, p. 57 f).
of the firms in the centers were start-
ups, whereas 45 % were already exist-
ing firms which had been attracted to
the center. After three years, 40 % of
the firms had left the center, after five
years 62 %. Survival ratios were just
slightly better than those of comparable
firms outside centers. Overall job crea-
tion amounted to about 17,000, many of
which would have been created any-
way. Net job creation was estimated to
be somewhere between 2,000 and
4,000.
In terms of business incubation, the ever in-
creasing efforts to foster private business have
given rise to a new sector: subsidy consul-
tancy. It has been estimated that between
1,500 and 2,500 different business promotion
programs exist in Germany,31 an observation
which leads to metaphors such as "promotion
jungle". Cutting a way through this jungle is
no easy task, especially for SME, which – un-
like large companies – can hardly afford a de-
partment which specializes in government re-
lations and subsidy scanning. Moreover, sup-
port measures are diverse in all sorts of ways.
Some programs have only limited funds avail-
able and are based on the first come, first take
principle, which often implies that no funds
are available towards the end of the fiscal
year. Application procedures are not stan-
dardized, and the forms which have to be
filled out are often quite comprehensive. In
many cases, the time period between applica-
tion and allocation is unpredictable. It is thus
sensible to assume that risk and high transac-
tion costs keep many SME from making use
of government support measures.
The Advisory Committee on Mittelstand Pol-
icy, a body linked to the Federal Ministry of
Economics which consists of SME association
representatives and independent experts, has
                                                  
31 "Auf der Jagd nach Subventionen", Handelsblatt,
22 July 1996.
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drawn a straightforward conclusion: it
proposed to reduce the number of gov-
ernment support programs and increase
transparency, consistency, and efficiency
(Mittelstandsbeirat 1999). Moreover, it
proposed a rigorous evaluation of gov-
ernmental intermediary institutions, with a
discontinuation of those which are not
highly significant. The only type of sup-
port activities which is affirmed are fi-
nancing programs of government devel-
opment banks. Rather than showering
SME with inefficient support measures,
the Committee argues, the government
would be well-advised to pursue a rigor-
ous policy of deregulation and liberaliza-
tion. The document emphasizes tax re-
form, reduction of the government share in
GDP and of levies on wages to finance so-
cial security (and actually a cut down of
social security), reduction of unemploy-
ment support and other measures which
encourage not to work, relaxation of layoff
regulations, reduction of minimum wages,
relaxation of working time limitations,
consumer protection and environmental
legislation.
This leads to one of the main paradoxes of
SME support policy in Germany: Since
the political rationale to pursue it is very
strong, there are rather too many financial
resources available, especially in declining
and structurally weak regions, and there-
fore the framework conditions for rigorous
evaluation and performance-related ap-
praisal of the necessity of each single pro-
gram and instrument are not favorable.
One of the strengths of the German system
thus turns into a disadvantage, namely the
willingness of the government to shape
economic restructuring rather than leave it
to the anarchy of market processes. In this
respect, it is important to note that in fact
there has been a profound evolution of
business support policies, moving from
traditional, selective industrial policy (which
often favored large enterprise) to generic sup-
port measures. However, the latter tend to be
supply-driven, thus ironically reflecting one of
the major problems of SME support measures
in developing countries. To establish moni-
toring and evaluation systems, and make SME
support (as well as other meso-level activities)
more performance-oriented is one of the main
challenges the German system is currently
confronting.
7 Main challenges of German
SME support policies
SME support policies in Germany are in a
constant state of flux, reflecting newly arising
problems, challenges and opportunities, as
well as the decentralized structure of formula-
tion and implementation, and foreign influ-
ences. In fact, the latter element, in the form
of EU policies, played an increasingly impor-
tant role in the last years, and there is no rea-
son to believe that it will play a diminishing
role in the near future. EU policy is changing
German SME support policies in three ways.
First, the EU commission has pursued a re-
strictive and strict course regarding subsidy
control, an area where it has a legally estab-
lished mandate and thus does not depend on
negotiations in the Council of Ministers. EU
regulations governing subsidies to private
businesses tend to be more restrictive than
national regulations. In practical terms, this
means that certain branches of industry and
services are exempt from subsidies (e.g. de-
clining industries with surplus capacities or
shopping centers). It also means that well-
established instruments, like support to firms
which are in crisis, are no longer legal. In
general terms, it means that business support,
including SME support, is supposed to be-
come less discretionary and more market-
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oriented and generic. It also means that the
traditional German way of supporting
SME, i.e. very much in an ad-hoc manner,
will have to give way to more thoroughly
formulated policies.
Second, and related to the latter point,
evaluation will become much more im-
portant. Within in the German system,
monitoring and evaluation practices are at
best rudimentary. It is mainly due to the
pressure of the EU Commission that more
systematic evaluations are conducted
nowadays. This includes ex-ante evalua-
tions, i.e. a more systematic appraisal of
problems and planning of goals and meas-
ures, and ex-post evaluations, i.e. third-
generation evaluations based on common
methodologies and conducted by inde-
pendent agencies.
Third, the most recent EU policy state-
ment established that future SME support
measures will have to address gender and
environment issues. The first aspect did
not appear at all in German SME support
policies so far, except for a few special
programs for business start-ups, and the
second aspect played only a limited role,
mainly with respect to investment in envi-
ronmentally sound technologies and envi-
ronmental management systems.
The new Länder continue to be another
important issue of German SME support.
Despite extensive support programs, busi-
ness dynamics there are lagging in such a
way that some observers express the con-
cern that the region may turn into "Ger-
many’s mezzogiorno", and the fact that re-
cent economic growth rates in the East
were lower than in the West does little to
alleviate such fears. It is now well-
established that intense support will have
to continue, and policy makers will con-
tinue to experiment with new and im-
proved instruments.
Another tendency which will probably con-
tinue is to focus private sector-oriented sup-
port programs specifically on SME. In par-
ticular, this applies to R&D support, which
tended to have a large enterprise bias in the
past, not the least due to costly programs in
areas like space research and nuclear and fu-
sion energy. So far, SME participation in
R&D programs and interaction between R&D
institutions and SME is moderate at best.
There is another tendency, namely towards
public-private partnership and network-based
programs. Reasonably effective and efficient
activities like the GO Initiative probably show
the shape of things to come. In particular, this
may lead to efforts to move from supply-
driven measures to a balance between supply-
and demand-driven activities.
Finally, there will be an increasing pressure
on ministries to prove the efficacy of support
policies. In the past, the main indicator of
program success was that the available funds
were spent, and spent in an orderly way, at the
end of a budget year. With the pressure on
governments to cut their budgets being on the
increase, it is likely that business support pro-
grams will come under increased scrutiny.
Likewise, the performance pressure on insti-
tutions like technology centers, incubators,
and training center, as well as chambers and
other private sector organizations, will in-
crease. In the past, it was virtually unthinkable
that government-funded support institutions
with unsatisfactory performance were closed
down. Such measures are becoming thinkable.
8 Policy conclusions for Latin
America
The main message of this paper is: The Ger-
many economy has a strong base of SME,
even though it is less SME-based than is often
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assumed. The strong performance of SME
in Germany is due to
• at the macro-level, a setting of stable
macroeconomic, political and regu-
latory framework conditions, in-
cluding the functioning of markets
and a comparatively limited anti-
SME bias. In particular, SME do not
encounter systemic obstacles in
terms of access to credit and con-
tinuous technological upgrading.
• at the micro-level, a quality-based
pattern of competition between
SME and a strong reliance of large
companies, many of them heavily
exposed to global competition, on
competitive SME suppliers.
• at the meso-level, a strong basic
business support structure (institu-
tions and instruments) at federal,
Land and local levels, based on both
governmental and private sector or-
ganizations, which is complemented
by specific SME support programs
which address specific challenges,
rather than substitute for weak ge-
neric support structure or adverse
macro-economic conditions. These
programs are more than just icing on
the cake, but even without them
Germany would probably have a
strong base of SME.
• at the meta-level, a value system
which encourages entrepreneurship
and achievement, as well as societal
institutions which create favorable
conditions for a dynamic develop-
ment of the private sector. This in-
cludes a commitment of the political
system for actions to shape a sup-
portive environment for companies,
including SME, and recently espe-
cially addressing SME. Many of the
typical problems of collective action
(e.g. vocational training, R&D) were
solved through the creation of specific
institutions a long time ago. Relation-
ships between major societal groups,
despite being conflictive, are often
problem-solving oriented, and the suc-
cessful resolution of profound conflicts
reinforces this orientation. In particular,
there are functioning communication
channels between government and the
private sector, both informally and on
an institutional basis.
In other words, Germany has not found some
kind of magic formula to create a particularly
dynamic SME sector. Rather, SME and SME
support are an essential element of an overall
system which favors industrial growth. In
terms of policy recommendations for Latin
American countries, the conclusions to be de-
rived from the German experience are
straightforward:
• At the meta-level, strengthen those ele-
ments which favor entrepreneurship and
a business-friendly environment.
Moreover, it is not sufficient to have a
rhetoric of creating favorable conditions
for entrepreneurial activities. Consis-
tence between rhetoric and practice is
essential.
• At the macro-level, secure framework
conditions which create a competitive
structure of markets. An important rea-
son of the mediocre performance of
SME is that they are often crowded-out
by large firms which can exploit market
failures or privileged access to the gov-
ernment. Another reason is the fact that
SME sometimes can survive by pro-
ducing mediocre products and selling
them to non-demanding customers.
Further key issues are the establishment
and enforcement of property rights, and
the availability of means of conflict
resolution, such as fair and effective law
courts.
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• Still at the macro-level, alleviate the
anti-SME bias in the economy, es-
pecially with respect to the amount
of time a business has to spend to
deal with cumbersome government
regulations, and regarding access to
credit and other market failures.
• At the meso-level, strengthen ge-
neric business support structures
(e.g. the financial system, including
guarantee banks and specialized ex-
port finance and insurance institu-
tions).
• Additionally at the meso-level, cre-
ate SME support institutions with a
clear focus, on top of generic sup-
port structures, rather than cover-all
organizations. Both specialization
and rivalry can improve the per-
formance of support institutions.
• Still at the meso-level, support restruc-
turing of business associations. They
can play an important role in articulat-
ing demands of the private sector, espe-
cially SME, as well as in providing
services to member firms. However,
business associations tend to be weak in
most Latin American countries.
• In terms of geographical aggregation,
create decentralized, competent institu-
tions and self-help organizations. The
solution of general problems, like ac-
cess to credit, is one thing, which in
most cases has to be done at the na-
tional level (unless local credit coop-
eratives are a viable option). Addressing
the specific problems of a given set of
SME is another thing, and here prob-
lems tend to be idiosyncratic and local-
ized. National organizations will find it
difficult to address such problems, es-
pecially in medium and large countries.
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Annex
1 Overview of the Conditions of some Credit Programs
PROGRAM DURATION/YEARS FREE
OF PREMIUM
INTEREST RATE
EFFECTIVE IN % P.A.
ERP-equity support (EKH) West 20/10. east 20/10 5.57/5.29
ERP-start-up West 15/3. east 20/10 4.32/3.8
DtA-Start-up 10/2 4.85
DtA-Startgeld 10/2 6.4
ERP-Regional Program 10-15/2 4.32
ERP-Construction Program 15-20/5 3.80
KfW-Mittelstand program 10/2  and others 4.85
ERP-Environmental Program West 10-15/2. east 15-20/5 4.32/3.8
DtA-Environmental program 10/2 4.85
KfW-Mittelstand program (foreign country) 10/2 4.85
2 Internet information and adresses
Institutes focusing at SME-research
Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn (IFM):
http://www.ifm-bonn.org
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung:
http://www.rwi-essen.de/
Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Universität Mannheim:
http://www.ifm.uni-mannheim.de/
Meso institutions
Steinbeis Foundation:
http://www.stw.de
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Guarantee banks:
http://www.buergschaftsbank.de
ZENIT:
Http://www.zenit.de
Euro Info Centre:
http://www.eic.de
Association of Technology Incubators in Germany:
http://www.adt-online.de
Sparkasse:
http://www.sparkasse.de
Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller Forschungsgemeinschaften Otto von Guericke e.V.
http://www.aif.de
Rationalisierungskuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft (RKW):
http://www.rkw.de
Business Angels Germany:
http://www.businessangels.de
Chambers:
http://www.ihk.de, http://www.diht.de, http://www.hwk.de
Federal Information Service for foreign trade (bfai):
http://www.bfai.de
Start-up network:
http://www.existenzgruender-netzwerk.de
Fraunhofer Society:
http://www.fhg.de
Max-Planck-Society:
http://www.mpi.de
Go-Initiative:
http://www.gfw-nrw.de
Databases about support programs:
Programmes in Germany on the federal, regional and European level:
http://www.bmwi.de/foerdb/
R&D information service about programmes of the EU:
http://www.cordis.lu
SME- information from the Ministry of Economics:
http://www.bmwi.de
